University of Central Florida

STARS
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations
1974

Editorial Advertising: A Means of Free Expression?
Alan Wayne Brown
University of Central Florida

Part of the Communication Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/rtd
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information,
please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation
Brown, Alan Wayne, "Editorial Advertising: A Means of Free Expression?" (1974). Retrospective Theses
and Dissertations. 91.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/rtd/91

EDITORIAL ADVERTISING&

A MEANS OF FREE EXPRESSION?

BY
ALAN WAYNE BROWN
B.A. Florida Technological University, 1971

THESIS
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Communication
in the Graduate Studies Program of
Florida Technological University

Orlando, Florida

1974

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

Chapter

Page

INTRODUCTION ••••••••••••• , ••••••

1

PURPOSE •••• , •• ,, •• , •••• , • •• , ., .•• •, •••••• ·

J

OF PROBLEM ••••••••••••.·•••••• •.,. •·• ••••• • • .•

4

STATEMENT OF
STATEMENT

e • • • • • • • • • , • • ·• • • • , • • • • •

e •• , • • , •• , • • • • • • • •

4

IN PERSPECTIVE......................

6

Origin and Purpose •••••••••••••••••••• ~···•••••••

6

Changing Interpretation •••••••••••••••••••• o~••••

9

Maintaining The Free Expression
System Today ••••••••• , , •••• •.•••• •·. , ••••••••••••• ~

11

Summary ••••••••••••••••••••••• , •••••• • ••••• ., •• , • •

13

METHODOLOGY ••••••.•••••••• , • , • , ••• ,

1, FREE

EXPRESSION

2, ADVERTISING, EDITORIALIZING, AND
FREE EXPRESSION •••••••••••••••• ,.• , ••••

e , • ••••••• • • • •

15

Advertising As An Institution ••• , ••••••••••••••••

15

Advertising As Communication •••••••••••••••••••••

16

Advertising And Free Expression ••••••••••••••••••

18

Editorial Advertising••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

20

Summary • • • • • , • , • • • • , • • , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

25

), EDITORIAL ADVERTISING' ·PRACTICAL
AND LEGAL STATUS., ••••••• e••••••••••••••••••••••••••

27

Access To The Media ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

28

Print Media Access •••••••• , ••••••••••••••••••••

)2

Broadcast Media Access5••••••••••••••••••••••••

35

Access To Other Mediae••••••s••••••••••••••••••

40

1 _~2819

iii

iv

Chapter

Page

Manifestations of Editorial Advertising •••••••••

o •••

41

Print Media •• , ••••••••• , ••••••••• ·••••••• , •••••• , • •

41

Broadcast Media•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••··-···

43

Other Medi~••••••••••••••••••••••~••••••••••••••••

44

Status Of Editorial Advertisingc
Revie\'!' ·_Qf. Cases.....................................

45

Print Media ••••••••••••••••••••••••• , •••••••••••••

46

Broadcast Media •••••••••

o. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

48

Initial cases...................................

48

Appellate cases. • • • • • • • • • • • • .• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

56

Supreme court decisibn.~~·i•••••••••~• • • • • • • • • •

61

Leg~l

Other Media ••••••

•

~

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

f

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

68

Summary ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ·• • • • • • •.• • •

71

4, ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION, AND QONCLUSION •••••••••• e•••••

73

• • • • • • • •

73

Print Media ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

74

Broadcast Media ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

76

Other Media•••••••••••••••••••••••••o••••••••••••

81

Implementation ••••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••

81

Suggestions For Future Research,, ••••••••••••••••••

86

Summary and Conclusions •••••••••••••••••••••••• e•••

87

APPENDIX ••• , , , , • , f),, ••• ,. ~,,,, •• , •••••••• , • ••• • • • • • • • • •

89

BIBLIOGRAPHY. , •••• , •••••• , ••• , • , ••••• , , •••

91

Paramount IsS? ue s ••••••••••••••••••••••••• o •

e • • , • • • • • • • • •

Introduction
With the ratification of tbe Bill of

Right~

in 1?91,

the framers -of the Constitution guaranteed every citizen
the unabridgeable right to express his or .her opinion
freely and without · fear of government reprisal • . This guaranty was simultaneously reinforced by granting the same
freedom to the press, thus providing a vehicle for such
1

expression.·

Today, the Constitution has been subjected to a vast
number of interpretations.

Generation after generation

has styled these interpretations to fit their needs, but
what about the needs of citizens, as individuals, to

express themselves?

The geometric progression of modern

technological development has and is constantly increas2

ing the speed of the -communication process.

This rapid

increase in technology has forced the tools for

expr~s

sion into ·the hands of a minority of highly skilled

com~

municators and has made it difficult, i£ not impossible,
for an individual to express his opinion to the rest of

1

u.s.

Const. Amendo I.

2

D.L. Sha , "Technologys Freedom From What?," Mass
Media and the National Experience, eds. T. Farrar and J.
Stevens;-(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 64-84,

1

2

his community.

Yet, the Constitution still gives him the

right to do so.
It would therefore seem logical that today•s citizen
use all those media and vehicles, provided him by today•s
technoaogy in order to express an opinion. . However, everyday realities

make it impractical for every citizen to

print an articlet
airwaves.

rite a column; or be heard over the

These impracticalities narrow the· citizen's

alternatives for expression.

One alternative which is

both practical from the citizen's point of view and profitable for the community as a whole is the institution
most commonly used in the everyday business world-- ·
J

advertising~

I

~

The idea to use this commercial institution as a way

to express opinions openly and with a minimal amount of
editing

is

not a novel one.

As stated by Mr. c ·. H.

Sandage. "the institution of advertising has many facets,
one of which is to serve as an instrument of communication.

This facet could be used by anyone who has senti4

m.ents to express, as a method to have his voice heard,"
Advertising for the purpose of expressing opinions is

J

David Potter, Peo}le of Plenty, (Chicago•
of Chicago Press, 1954 • pp. 168-171.

4
C.
Concept
eds, Co
Richard

University

H. Sandage • "Using Advertising to I mple ment the
of Freedom of Speech," The Role of Advertising,
H. Sandage and v. Fryburgert (Homewood, Illinois•
Irwin Inc., 1960), pp. 222-3.

not, however, quite the same · as commercial

adv~rtising.

This differentiation will be pointed out later in . the text.
This type of advertising, also, must be

identifi~d.

T.he

label for advertising of this nature has been -and, henceforth
shall be

~eferred

.

to as editorial advertising,

5 .

Editorial

advertising is defined as a spot of time or space paid for
by

individuals or groups for the purpose of expressing opi-

nions on issues of public importance.

6

Advertising for this purpose has been used in print
?
media, but recent court rulings have seriously questioned
8

its use in broadcast media.

It has also been used in

other media.

ST TEMENT OF PURPOSE
The purpose . of this study is to analyze various aspects
of editorial advertising in an effort to determine if its

continued and expanded use can serve as a modern means of

5

New York Times v. Sullivan, 11 L. ed, 2nd. 698 (1964).

·6

Business Executives• Movement for Vietnam Peace,

25 F.c.c. 2nd, 242 (1970).
7

New York Times v. Sullivan.

8

Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democra tic National
Commit ee1 Federal Communication Co mmission v. Busine ss
Executives• Movement for Vietnam P acea Post-Newsweek
Stations, Capital Area Inc. v~ B,E.Mor American Broadcasting Company v. D.N,C. 41 LW 4688 (1973).

4

free expression.

It is intended that this analysis might

also serve as a compendium to facilitate decision making
for any and all persons

ho consider the use of paid space

or time to express an opinion.
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
In order to determine whet·h er editorial advertising can

be used further as a means of free expression, the following questions must be answereds
1.

How does editorial advertising differ from other
forms of advertising and from ot·h er 'f orms of editorializing?

2.

is the existing legal and practical status
of editorial advertising?
Wha~

METHODOLOGY
The research questions

po~ed

and the uniqueness of the

phenomenon under investigation suggested that a library
9
survey be conducted.
In addition,an analysis is being

conducted.

It focuses on the technical differences and

the constitutional background, as well as the legal status
and the practical

ses of editorial advertising.

The library survey is divided into three major areas.
The first area is a revie

9

of the relevant literature on

William Sattler, MThe Library Survey," An Introduction to Graduate Study in Speech and Theatre,-ed. Clyde w.
Do (East Lansing. Mich.a Michigan State University Press,
1 961 ) • p • J 2 •

5
free speech and First Amendment interpretations.

The second

major area focuses on the institution of advertising as a

general means of communication and, more specifically, on
editorial advertising as a means of free expression.

This

area also looks at other forms of editorializing and different types of advertising.

The third major area reviews

both the legal and · practical status of -editorial advertising.

This .a rea also involves the key issue of access to

the media.
Sections reviewing the legal status are limited to
those agency, appellate court,

a~d _ supreme

court decisions

which directly involve the use of editorial advertising.

Chapter 1
FREE EXPRESSION IN PERSPECTIVE

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.lO

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE
Consideration of any method for implementing free

expression must rest upon a basic ·understanding of the First
Amendment and its interpretations.
understanding, is the vie ing of

Essential to such an

amendment within the
11
contextual framework of its origin. purpose and meaning.
thi~

The origin of the amendment dates to the late 1780's
at which time there was concern for revising the newly
adopted Constitution to include safeguards for individual
freedoms.

During this same period, there surfaced a uni-

que attitudeo

It regarded free expression as a function of

an individual's speech and writing, as well as the tradi-

10

u.s.

Const. Amend. I.

11

Paul Watzlawick, Janet Beavin. and Ron Jackson,
Pragmatics of Human Co mmunication, {New Yorka W. •
Norto·n & Company, 1967), pp. 19-Zi6.
6

7

tional use of the press.

To put it more bluntly. "free

speech" was attitudinally eleva ed to· .a position which had
previously been held only by the "free press" concept,
This attit.ude a·pP.ears to .have. be.e n another manifestation

of the democratic zeitgeist.

Further -evidence of this attitude pervades the research
of George Anastaplo who states 0 "Un'til the establishment
of the American Repub.l ic., 'liberty of the pr·e ss• had been

emphasized when freedom of expression for the public at
large was provided.

'Freedom of speech' ••• ean be said to

have been expanded by the First Amendment to include the
entire population •• "

12

This same attitude, as to the meaning of the First
r

Amendment, was mo·s t clearly stat-e-d by the major author of

the Bill of Rights, James Madison.

~adison

justified

ing the Constitution with a lengthy speech in 1789
he referred _to the proposed First Amendment.

It

ame nd~

herein

as worded

thus, • ••• The people shall not be deprived or abridged of
their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentimentsz and .the freedom of the press, as one of the great
bulwarks of liberty, shall

be

inviolableGe•'

13

It should

also be pointed out that Madison's wording of the amendment

12

George Anastaplo The Constitutionalists Notes on
the First Amendment, (Dallas& Southern Methodist University
Press, 1971), p. 125.

13

Bernard Schwartz The .Bill of Righ s r A Docume nta ry
History, II (New York• Chelsea House Publishers and McGra
Hi 11 Inc , , 1 9 71 ) , p • 1 o·2 6 •

8

had been suggested to him by various State conventions and
individual representatives.
The First Amendment, at the time of its origin, can
be said to have reflected the attitude that free

~peech

and

free press be conscribed into a basic right of free communicative· expre.ssion,

This attitude must not, however, be

construed as the purpose or meaning of the amendment, but
rather the philosophy held by its originators.
·. The purpose of the amendment was to lay the groundwork

for the maintenance of the values and philosophies expo.unded
in the late Eighteenth Century Republic.

This maintenance

could be realized with a general and flexible groundrule
which established an absolute right.
was and.'is one of the fe

The First Amendment

laws set don in the Constitution

which projects the foresight of its authors.

Their fore-

sight was seasoned with a tradition of press freedom found
in their Anglo-Saxon culture.
tempered

Because of. this tradition,

ith their new attitude, the originators of the

First Amendment purposefully sought to guaranty an entire
14
system of Tree expression.
A "systematic" vie

of the First Amendment's purpose

also supports the unique attitude of individual free speech
and a free press as being complementary.

Indeed, a free

press could be the vehicle for an individual's exercise of

14

Thomas Emerson. Toward A General Theory of The
Firat Amendment, (New Yorkt Vintage Books, 19b7), p. viii.

9

free speech.

A "systematic" view also ensures a ••method

of securing participation by the members of the society in
social, including political, decision making."

1.5

Thus a

system of free expression, by guaranteeing an absolute
right, can adapt to societal changes over periods of time.
This,

then~~as

the purpose of the First Amendment.

CHANGING INTERPRETATION
The First Amendment, like the entire Constitution, has
been interpreted by each generation of Americans to meet
their needs for expression, as perceived at the time.

Inter-

pretations, while changing and differing to meet these needs,
have not necessarily detracted from the amendment's pripurpose ••

ma~y

~the

institutionalizing of a durable system

for free expression.
Interpretations of the First Amendment are also changing,
like Toffler's "Discovery, Application, Impact" continuum,
at an increased rate.

19

For example, when a new interpreta-

tion is accepted and applied, its impact sets precedents or
creates problems that, in turn, demand newer interpretations.
Thus, there is a need for new interpretations to meet accelera~ing

technical and social changes and the constant need of

free expression maintenance.
The job of interpreting the First Amendment has, since
the ratification of the Constitution, been assigned to the

15

Ibid., p. 9.

16Alv1n
. Toffler, Fu ture Shock, (New Yorks
House, 1970), pp. 19-35.

Random

10

Supreme Court of the United States.

The justices who com-

prise this body have ·, for the past couple of decades,
become increasingly aware of the need to fo

ulate their

interpretations with -respect to the rapidly increasing
and social changes.

t~chnological

cintly

i~~~atrates

and free

e~pression
.

William Hachten suc-

the Court's awareness of rapid change
needs when he states:

I

The Supreme Court has had to cope ith the
technological revolution that has shaped mas~ communications in this century. In the days of small,
hand-printed news sheets, James Madison and the
architects of the First Amendment could not forsee
giant high-speed rotary presses, network television,
communica tion satellites, motion pictures, radio, or
orld-wide ne s agencies strung together by teletype
and telephone. · But had _they had such foresight, it
is unlikely that they would have · rewritten the First
Amendment ·e It is part· of the · genius of our Constitution tha t each generation can adapt the document's
broad enduring principles to the changing needs of
time .17
Modern interpretation of the First

Amendme~t

not

only reflects an awareness of increasing technology and
increasing free expression needs, but also suggests the
testing of a new means to maintain the free expression
system.

Speaking on this point Supreme Court Justice

Brennan has stated, "Thus, although 'full and free discussion' of ideas may have been a reality ·in the heyday
of political pamphleteering, modern technological developments in the field of communications have made the soapbox

1?

illiam Hachten, The Supreme Court Qn Freedom of
the Pressp (Ames, Iowaa The Io a State University Press,

19b8},

p.

6.

11

orator and the leafleteer virtually obsolete.u

18

This ob-

solesence of the soapbox in the square and the handbill .type
of pamphlet, as vehicles within the free expression system,
suggests that other .vehicles for carrying out the same function be devised,

The present technology can dictate the

device · and- the
modern interpretations of the First Amend-·
-

ment can maintain the free expression system.

MAINTAINING THE FREE EXPRESSION
SYSTEM TODAY
Technology · has forced upon interpreters of the First
Amendment, as well as today•s society in general, the need
for new methods to maintain free speech and free press concepts,

This same technology can also satisfy these needs,

but technology alone may not be enough,

Likewise, the

institutionalizing of free expression by the First Amendment may not, by itself, maintain ·free expression.
_·Maintenance of a system of free expression also
.·

depends on practical, day-by-day

method~

for individuals

and groups to lay their ideas and opinions before the pub-

lie.

Furthermore, in the

ords of Thomas Emersons

eeean effective system of freedom of expression
requires a realistic administrative structure. It
is not enough to merely formulate the broad principles
or simply to incorporate them in general rules of
law~
It is necessary to develop a frame ork of doctrines, practices ·, and institutions which ill take
into account the actual · forces at work and make
possible the realistic achievement of the objectives

18

Justice Brennan, 47 LW 4719.

12
so.u ght •.19

The objective sought in this case is the self-fulfillment o·f individ"Ual and group needs for expression,

And, as

Emerson pointed out, the day-by-day methods for achieving
..

this objective lies in formulating .. new do.ctrines .and institutions.
The purposes of this chapter and this study are not

..

to develop a doctrine for free expression.
are to give the reader a perspective of

~he

In~tead,

they

First Amendment

and then to consider a new method for maintaining . the free
expression system.

Therefore, the last part ' of Emerson's

framework--:---the ·.( modern) institutio.fl, emerges as a method

to implement free expression.
Any institution, by its nature, cannot ··radically

change the present system for c.ommunicating inforll's.tion,

ideas, and opinions into some Orwellian nightmare.

Any

method .chosen, therefore, must work within the present
· communication systems,
This is not to say, however,- that a new method cannot

eliminate -errors or improve upon the performance of the
present system.

Thomas Emerson, calling for an "affirma-

tive promotion of freedom of expression" says, "There are
numerous reasons for the failures now threatening the
existence of the system (of free expression).

Probably the

most significant is the overpowering monopoly over the

19
{Ne

Tho as Emerson The ~yst· em of Freedom of Expression,
York&
Random House Inc., 1970), p. ·4.
•

13
means of communication acquired by the mass media."

20

This

same point of view is supported by Zechariah Chafee Jr.
who views the concentrated power of today's mass media
as an antithesis to the essential conditions for a healthy
public opinion, the essential conditions being a diversity
21

of

~xpre~~~d

views.

A new method for maintaining the purpose of the First

Amendment in

t~day•s

society should be an institution which

can work within the present communications media, while also
eliminating some of the failures which the media have had
due to their monopolistic position.
An institution for the maintenance of free expression
does exist in the form of modern advertising.

Within this

institution, a method also exists by which individuals and
groups can still achieve free speech without radically disrupting the present communications media.
and this method will be

thoroug~~Y

This institution ·

examined in the next

chapter.

SUMMARY
Muc-h of this chapter has focused on the background of

free expression as embodied in the First Amendment of the
Constitution,

Specific attention was focused on the atti-

tudes held by James Madison and other originators of the

20

21

Ibid. , p. 62 7 •

Zechariah Chafee Jr.~ Government and Mass Commun~cat~,
(Chicago& University of Chicago Fress,-r947J. pp. 21- 9.

14
Bill of Rights to show that the dual concepts of free
speech and free press were, in fact, at least complementary
if not synonymous when the amendment was created··

This chapter also pointed out that the basic purpose
of the amendment was to establish an entire system of free

expressi<;)l.l _Which could adapt to changing times.

With a

systematic view in mind, the complementary role of free
speech and free press assumed greater meaning.

fhe press,

in accordance with the attitude surrounding First Amendment composition, could be seen as a vehic-le for free
speech.

Interpretations of the First Amendment, while differing
over time, did not necessarily detract from the amendment's
basic purpose.

Furthermore, modern Supreme Court interpre-

tations were shown -to reflect an awareness of the demands
of modern technology.
And finally, it was suggested that a method to maintain
the free expression system would have to include not only
modern interpretations of the amendment, but also an institution

whi~h

could work within the present mass communi-

cations systems to eliminate past mistakes and still provide individual self-fulfillment.

It was further suggested

that maintenance of the free expression system could be
accomplished by the modern institution of advertising.

Chapter 2
ADVERTISING, EDITORIA.LIZING, AND FREE EXPRESSION
ADVERTISING AS AN INSTITUTION

Advertising need not be . viewed only as the business
world's tool for mass selling.

Such a view would be simp-

listic and only partially correct.

Advertising, also can

be thought of as an institution that assumes an important
and far reaching role in modern society.

Advertising, as

an institution of social control, .h as been compared to

other major institutions as the Church and the University•

It is similar to these latter institutions due to its
extensive influence.

It is largely differentiated from

Church and University because . it is the offspring of modern
22

economic abundance.
spiritual ~ needs

Whereas the Church .meets society's

and the University meets the needs for self-

betterment through reason and learning, advertising satisfies people's economic desires and communicates, to them,
their role-s as consumers.

Advertising, in. conjunction with mass media, fulfills
its

so~ial

role by affecting attitudes.

In the

ords of

Mr. Potter," ••• the only institution which we have for

22

Potter, People of Plenty, p. 176.

15

16
instilling new needs, for training people to act as consumers, for altering men•s values, and thus for hastening
their adjustment to potential abundance is advertising."

2)

Mr. Leo Bogart, leading advertising strategist,

Furthermo~e,

concurs with Mr. Potter by saying that, "advertising is
more than _an economic forcer it is also a prof.ound in-

fluence on our cUlture, on our values, and on the quality

24

of our life."
Advertising, as an institution, does have a strong
social effect.

It largely reinforces existing social

attitudes and has the potential for changing attitudes.

25

An institution with such influential capabilities as
modern advertising ean also provide the necessary tool
for maintaining .f ree expression.

ADVERTISING AS COMMUNICATION
If advertising, . as an institution, reinforces or
changes social values and attitudes, then it accomplishes
such effeets by communicating ideas, information, and
opinions. - Advertising, in a more basic context, is communication, i.e., it "involves the symbolic representation

23

Ibid • • p • 1 75.

24

Leo Bogart, Strategy In Advertising, (New Yorks
Harcourt Brace & World, Inc,, 1967), p. vii.

25

Potter, People of Plenty, p. 188,

of the context of a thought."

17

26

More succinctly, advertising

may be defined as "any paid form of mass media presentation
and promotion of ideas, goods or services by an identified
2?
sender.•
The relevant aspect of this definition, for
purposes of free expr·e ssion, deals with ideas and not
goods ·o r . ~ervices.
The entire advertising process also embodies commun28

ication,

Briefly, the advertiser (communicator) designs

(encodes) his advertisement (message) and transmits it
via media (channels) to his audience (receivers).or may not buy (positive response).,
coded.

pre-engi~eered

.

messages

29

~ho

may

.The purpose of these

is to communicate as pre-

cisely and with as much impact as pos.sible, given a strictly limited amount of space or time.

Precision, competition,

and complexity of process all demand that advertising be

a form of communication

characteri~ed by

artistry, scien-

tific knowledge,. and technical skill,
Advertising, viewed within a communication

eontex~.

assumes a more basic and broader meaning than that attributed it by everyday business world connotations,

26

It is not

Karl-Erik Warneryd and Kjell Nowak, Mass Communication
and Advertising, (Stockholm: Economic Research Institute,
A B Svenska Telegrambyran STB, 1967), p. 12,
27
Ibid. ' p. 16.

28

29

Ibid •• pp, 13, 17, 26,
Toffler, p. 164.

1·8

just the clamoring of merchants for people's attention.
It is an economic and sociai institution based on communication .Processes.

Furthermore, advertising's propinquity

to business practices can be seen .a s a practical asset for
maintenance of free expression.

Its daily use throughout

this cen~~ has fostered a communicat1on system which .
need be altered only insofar as the content of the messages
be changed from selling co.mpany products to insuring that

citizens • opinions be presented·.

ADVERTISING AND FREE EXPRESSION
It has already been suggested that, in order to
maintain a system of free expression, one would most likely
have to work with the established systems of mass communication whose

stru~tures

are controlled by a minority of

editors, station managers, and skilled technicians.

It has

also been suggested that, with the rapidity of technological
advancement, the trend in controlling the mass communication systems will rely even more heavily on those specialists and

~nagers

mentioned above,

Furthermore, it has

been pointed out that, perhaps, the only active institution existing which can be used to maintain the free expression system is modern advertising.
The notion to use advertising to maintain free
expression, as stated in the introduction, is not new.

Mr. Co H. Sandage expounded this idea to the Association
for Education in Journalism in 1958.

As already ci ed,

he too viewed advertising as an institution with its

19
.,

major "facet .. being communication.

In the same speech,
.

Mr. Sandage continued

by

.

expanding the idea to use adver-

tisirigt
True, its communicating function has been confined largely to informing and persuading people in
respect to products and services. On the other
hand, it can be madeequally available to those who
wish . to - inform and persuade people in respect to a
city bond issue, cleaning up community crime, the ·
'logic' of ath~ism the needs for better educational
facilities, the abusive tactics of given law enforcement officers, or any other sentiment held by any
individual who wishes to present such sentiment to
the public,JO
This kind of concept seems readily easy to grasp,
but the fact is that very few people, especially those
in the various disciplines of mass communication, have
done little to see that free expression keep pace with
technological progress.
tion to this lack

of

Mr. Sandage also brought atten-

action.

He attacked obsolete methods

for free speech implementation by sayinga
Adhe rence to the old concepts of implementing
free speech can only curtail and largely destroy
the effective communication of the lay citizen with
various publics. The ne er concept of using advertising as a communication vehicle for the lay citiz.e n can make each purchaser of a t o-inch column
of space his own editor and publisher. The freedom to speak is meaningless unless there is effective machinery for distributing speech to those
ears one wishes to reach.31
Sandage's theme is similar to other sources cited.
The similarity lies in the fact that many persons in the

)0
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31
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mass communication sys·tems, as well as some in the legal

institutions, have not yet realized or accepted the fact
that old methods of free speech do not meet citizens•
needs in a rapidly advancing, technological age.

Modern

advertising, however, does presently have the capability

to

acc~mplish

the task.
EDITORIAL ADVERTISING

Advertising, on the institutional level, provides
a means to work within present systems to maintain free
expression.

Advertising, as communication, implies that

free expression is available if the opportunity is seized.
The next step would be to seek a specific tool, the
exact form of advertising, with which citizens could
exercise their free expression.
advertising

h~s

This specific type of

been labeled editorial advertising.

Editorial advertising has been defined as a spot of time
or space paid by individuals or groups for the purpose of
)2

expressing opinions on issues of public importance.
For the purpose of semantic clarity,- it will be necessary to dwell further on the definition of editorial
advertising.

This is due to the legal and practical

questions which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Editorial advertising is differentiated from other
forms of advertising by two main factors.

32

One difference.

New York Times v. Sullivan, 11 L. ed. 2nd. 689
(1964).

2l
is the actual content of its· messages • . The other is the

person

o~

•

I

•

group who 1s sponsor1ng the message.

For

example, an ad, . written and paid for by John Public and
expressing his opinion on local air

·pollut~C?n

would qua.l ify as an editorial advertisement.
ad,

writt~n_. and

st.a ndards,
A similar

paid for by X Oil · Company, · would not qua-

lify as an editorial advertisement.

Because of its poten-

tially commercial benefits to X Oil Company, the latter
example

ould more accurately be labeled as a
3.3
relations institutional advertisement."

~public

Another very similar from of advertisement to editor34
ial advertising is the "public service institutional ad."
In this type of ad, ideas about an important social pro-

blem are given by an identified company9

"bu~

no effort

is made to indicate where the firm stands on the problem
.35
or what the firm has done about it~"
This typ~ of ad
again differs from editorial advertising

b~cause

of the

commercial sponsor.
A third type of similar advertising not to be confused witrr editorial advertising is the non-commercial .

JJ

Barb ra D. Coe, Advertising Practice, (Engle ood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972), p. 2.
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)6

institutional ad

v1hich usually promotes organizations like

Red Cross, American Cancer Society, Easter Seals,. etc.
This type of ad is also often referred to as a public service announcement.

The non-commercial institutional ad

contrasts from the editorial advertisement in that it
promotes

~ideas

which normally concern civic ventures, by

soliciting contributions for charitable institutions and
religious organizations, or issuing information about
services available from federal, state and local govern37
This type of advertising also varies due to
ment."
the fact that it is run free of charge by the media involved.

Because it is free, it is not always guaranteed

time or space and may be subject to somewhat more editing

than·

~

paid ad.

Other categories of advertising types which normally
show no resemblance to editorial advertising area
1.

Commercial Advertising (Business) - this
involves the selling of products or services
to middlemen.

2.

Commercial Advertising (Consumer) - this is
the selling of products and services to the
ultimate consumer. It is the most common
form of advertising.

3.

Demand Stimulation Advertising - this is
designed to stimulate a spe.cific type of
demand response in the market.)8

)6
Ibid., p. 3.
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Ibid.

38
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These latter categories are obviously all commercially
oriented and bear no resemblance to the former institutional
types

nich might be confused with editorial advertising.
Editorial advertising is, as Sandage stated, a ·new

concept.
for free

It may be seen as a spinoff of an old concept
~~P.ression . -

the editorial.

Editorial advertising,

however, is not nearly the same as the editorial.

As with

different types of advertising, a more detailed look at
the editorial will help create a better distinction between

it and the new .concept of editorial advertising.
· Freedom of expression pertaining specifically to
editorializing can be traced to 1801

hen " ••• President

Jefferson released from jail those who were still serving
sentences for such crtmes as printing 'peace and retirement
to the President (Adams),' and the federal government
abandoned the field of legislating against its critics."

39

In Jefferson's time, editorializing usually implied
the printing of an o·pinion on a public issue, most often

political.

Today, however, an editorial is either a

letter written to a newspaper by an individual citizen who

hopes his opinion will be printed, or it is a column of
opinion written by an editor· or

o~e

of his staff.

Since 1949, editorializing also occurs in the broad-

39

Harold Nelson, Freedom of the Press From Hamilton
to the Warren Court, (Indianapolis& Bobbs-Merrill Company;-Inc., 1967), p. xix.
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.
40
cast media.

This type of

editoriali~ing

is usually pre-

sented by a· commentator who holds definite opinions on the
topics discussed,

Broadcast editorials differ from those

in newspapers by one very important fact. They are sub41
ject to the Fairness Doctrine which allows advocates of
views oppose.d to those ·expressed by the commentator to
voice their opinion on the air.

Whether print or broadcast t;nedia, . the use of the editorial today as a means of free expression is severely
limited,

It is limited technically because not every letter

to the editor can be given space, nor can every advocate of
a public issue be given time to reply.·

The editorial is

limited politically by the fact that the gatekeeper (editor
·or station manager) may disagree with a submitted editorial
to the point that

~is

p·e rsonal prejudices motivate him to ·

find reason for not printing or broadcasting the submission.
The .new concept of editorial -advertising combines the
idea of the editorial with the modern institution of advertising, to give
opinion

wi~l

be

individuals a greater assurance that their
express~d

to their community.

The

assu~ance

mentioned here is the major difference between edit6rial
advertising and the editorial.

40
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or space is paid . for.
Finally, .there is one factor which places editorial
advertising in a unique category.
definition.

This factor is its legal

The actual legal status of editorial adverti-

sing is the subject .of the following chapter, but it is
important _to note here that editorial advertising is legally
similar to the editorial while being legally dissimilar to
commercial adve.rtising.

This seemingly paradoxical situa-

tion is best clarified by Justice Brennan who, in the
dec~sion

Court~s

on New York Times v. SullivanJ wrote;

The publication . here was not a commercial advertisement ••• It communicated information, expressed
opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses,
and sought financial support on behalf of a movement
. whose existence and. ·objectives are matters of the
highest public -· nterest ····a nd ·concern... Any other
conclusion ould discourage newspapers fro m ca rcying
editorial advertisements of this type, and so might
shut off an important ·o utlet for promulgation of
information and ideas by . persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities - who
wis·h to exercise their freedom of speech even
though t~ey are not members of the press.42
SUMMARY
The focus of this chapter has been on advertising as

a general means to maintain a free expression system.
As the previous chapter attempted to point out, the
most effective way to maintain free expression is to utilize
the present institutions.

42

Ne

This chapter has attempted to

York Times v. Sullivan, 11 ·1. ed. 2nd., p. 698,
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show that modern advertising is considered to be an institution holding significant economic and social .influence,
This influence and advertising•·s communicative nature were
shown to provide a contemporary avenue for maintaining free
expression.
This - chapter also considered a spec.ific tool by which

free expression can be maintained,

editorial advertising

This tool wa·s labeled

An attempt was ·also made to show

how the new coneept of editorial advertising differed from
other forms of advertising which appear to be quite similar,
except that they are either commercially sponsored or not
paid for at all.
This chapter also focused on the difference between
editorial advertising and present day editorial6

The

major difference being that the former is paid for while
the latter is note

One last characteristic difference was

also shown to be a legal de.finition.
was shown

t~

Editorial advertising,

have the same Constitutional rights as other

forms of editorializing.

Chapter J

EDITORIAL ADVERTISINGs

PRACTICAL AND LEGAL STATUS

The first chapter reported on the background of the
First Amendment, giving specific attention to the origin
and meaning.

The second chapter sheds light on a contem-

porary method for maintaining the free expression system
through the modern institution of advertising and the

specific tool, editorial advertising.
This chapter examines the basic philosophy upon which
editorial advertising, as a means of
This philosophy

in~olves

~ree

expression, rests.

the right of access to the media,

both print and broadcast.
This chapter also looks at examples of editorial
advertising in various media to show its everyday manifes-

tations.

Some of the examples have not, as of this inves-

tigation, been published or broadcast, but plans to do so
have been reported by reliable sources.

Other examples

of editorial advertising stem from the ·l egal cases revie ed.
This chapter finally focuses on those legal cases
I

directly involving editorial advertising and those cases
which serve as primary precedents.

Detailed attention is

given to all judicial decisions regarding editorial advertising and the First Amendment.
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ACCESS TO THE MEDIA

Maintenance of free expression depends on the cooperation of the modern mass communication systems including
ne spapers, radio and television networks, and other media
such as magazines, outdoor advertising companies, and
transportation companies which sell space for advertising
purposes.

The general public would find it extremely dif-

ficult to communicate with one another if were not for the
cooperation of these media,
Most of these systems are re·g ulated either governmentally or internally.

But ·the agencies and associations

that have been responsible for such regulation cannot
guarantee that free expression be a reality for all citizens.
Because of this practical deficiency there has been
a recent trend among constitutional experts and communi
cation

speciali~ts

for a right of access to the media by

individuals or groups seeking to express their opinions
on issues of public importance.
This right of access philosophy can be seen to have
stemmed from the fact that many of the mass media have not
cooperated, for various reasons, with those
voice an opinion.

ho want to

The lack of cooperation by the media,

in turn, has emanated from its current business nature.
Unlike the 1700's, free speech and free press have not
recently been regarded as synonymous among a number of
media managers,

Instead, many media people now equate

29
the free

pres~

concept with laissez-faire economicsa

43

i.e.,

some people of the print and broadcast ·p ress have styled

First Amendment interpretations to fit their business needs,
Their claim of "free press" really means "do not interfere

with our business" and serves to stifle others .whose "free
speech" rel1e_s _ on media access.

A leading proponent of a right of access to the media,
Jerome- Barron, discussed today•s First Amendment paradox

implied by the conflict between individual free speech
and freedom of the press, _ He stated&
To them (those hose ideas are .unacceptable
to editors) the mass communication industry replies:
The First Amendment guarantees our freedom to do as
we choose with our media. Thus the constitutional
imperative of free expression becomes a rationale for
repressing ~ compe-t ing ideas ,44
In addition, further inconsistencies in the practical

application of the First Amendment have pointed to the need
for a modern interpretation that considers the question of
media access.

Barron comme.nted s

While we have taken measures to ensure the
sanctity· of that which is saido e have not
inquired whether, as a practical matter, the
difficulty of acce.s s to the media of communica-

tion has made the right of expression somewhat
mythical.45
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. .

Arguments opposing a right of access have relied on
the logic that other media exist
for expression.

hi~h

might offer outl•ts

Arguments proposing further access, how-·

ever, have countered by saying that access relies "not so
much in an abundance of alternative media, but in an abundance of opportunities
. -·--46 to secure expression in media. with
the largest impact."
This same reasoning was found in
a pair of

lega~

expression,

decisions concerning the extent of free

"Restraints on freedom of speech are not

justified simply because alternative forms of expression
47
are available."
"As long as the medium sought is an
appropriate one, the availability of other media is irre48
levant. ••
Another reason favoring the need for a right of access
is the abridgement · of expression by private enterprise,
an area traditionally not covered by the First Amendment.
Proponents have stated that a new interpretation is needed
Nwhich focuses on the idea that restraining the hand of
government is quite useless ••• if a restraint on- free speech
.
49
is effectively secured by private groups."
Indeed,

46
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because mass media systems are basically profit oriented
and because they are trying to reach and please as large
an audience as possible, presentation of controversial
opinions have become ·impractical.

Therefore, proponents

have maintained that · the old constitutional interpretation

"is unrealistic if it prevents courts or legislatures from
requiring the media to do that which, for commercial reasons, they would be otherwise unlikely to do."
Opponents to further access include Mr.

50

c.

Daniel who

has purported the traditional argument that problems of
free expression should be kept witnin the media themselves.
He statedt
I am perfectly prepared to concede that there is
a pro·b lem ~of access to the press in this country.
My contention is that the remedies should be left
largely to the press itself and the reading public.51

Although Daniel disagrees

ith Barron as to the means

by which access should be obtained, he nevertheless admits

that there is a problem and the immediate future will
warrant solutions.

The major disparity in viewpoints is

that Daniel thinks that ulegislators and judges should not
be the ones to decide how much access there should be.•

52
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Daniel, "Right of Access and Reply," Conce pts And
Issues In The Ma ss Mediap eds, M.C. Emery and T.C. ·Smyth
1Dubuque, Iowas Wm, C, Brown Company, 1972), p. 2),

52

Ibid., p. 26.

·· Barron essentially has proposed that .there sh.o uld be
a new First Amendment interpretation that would include
access to the media as a basic right of free expression.
This extended right could not be abridged by government

and should not be allowed to be abridged by private enterprise.
Daniel, on the other hand, has proposed that the ques-

tion of access should be considered by . the media and that
judicial and legislative institutions should only suggest
and not force access rights.

Print Media Access
Access to the print media has been thoroughly discussed by William Douberley who generally agrees with

Barron's proposal and who offers editorial advertising as
53

an alternative vehicle.

Douberley contends that changes in mass communication
over the past two centuries have created a situation,
regaroing the press as a vehicle for · free . expression, which

has largely contradicted the First Amendment.

He has

stated that&
speech is not necessarily 'free' in the press.
Since it forms the center of the process of dissemination of ide~s, the press is the force that
can most effectively abridge expression by nulli-

53
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University of Florida Law Review., XXII (1969), p. 293.
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fying the opportunity for an idea to obtain public
exposure.54

He went further into this dichotomy by w:ritinga
the first amendment's frustration by a system
that· was thought ·to embody its goals is paradoxical.
The press was given constitutional protection because
it was thought to be the key to free expression.
The Courts have embraced this concept in upholding
editorial freedom and taking care to prevent the press
from falling under state control by means of a public
utility classification •• ,under present interpretations, free press inhibits free speech.55
Douberley ·c ontinued by stating, much like Barron,
that the reasons for this existing dichotomy were the ·C en-

tralization and monopolizing of modern newspapers.

Such

a situation has demanded that business considerations take
'

precedence over expression considerations· and thus has

given rise to non-controversial advertising and editorials
that only support popular attitudes.
This

inv~st igator

has also found evidence that the

trend toward monopoly stifling competition . in the mass

media, not to mention free expression, has been an everpresent problem.

The most recent example was reported in

the Orlando Sentinel Star

The article described action

by the Justice Department stating:

(It was) opposing continued operation by newspaper o\-vners. of tele·visioil and radio s'ations in St.
Louis, I~issouri and DesMoines,. Iowa ••• The department
said rene al of broadcasting licenses ••• ·ould not be
in the public interest because the publishers were
effectively hindering competiti~on in the dissemina-

55

Ibid.' p. 304.
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tion of news and advertising.56
The growing trend toward news monopoly lends some
support to earlier evidence

tha~

those who control mass

media are few and that their control has increased,.

For

these reasons access to the press has assumed greater relev·ance · especially when considering the maintenance of a

free expression system.
The trend toward press monopoly, along with other reasons, has fostered a parallel trend toward press access,
particularly involving the use of advertising.

In Zucker

y. Panitz, a case involving the use of advertising as an

access vehicle in a school newspaper, it was found that the
advertiser had a right to publish an antiwar advertisement
in the paper.

The advertisement had been refused by the

school principal on the ground that it was not related to
school activities, but the court stated that "the principal could not preclude the students from expressing their
57
'
views."
Writing on the judicial enforcement of a right of
access by means of advertising, Barron stateda
In Uhlman Ve Sherman (22 Ohio N.P. 225) an Ohio
lo er court held that the dependence and interest
of the public in the community newspaper, particularly when it is the only one, imposes the reasonable
demand that the purchase of advertising should be

56
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open to members of the public an the same basis.
Edi~orial advertising,

as

58 ·

35

already suggested, has been

a primary contender for supplying access to the press. ·
Researching its possible use in print media, Douberley
has

writt~ns .

An_ application of ~he first amendme·nt to free
speech type advertisements could provide an equally
effective means of access to the press, Advertorials
have been found to be an effective and relatively
inexpensive way to express ideas not recognized as
worthy of comment by editors. McCluhan has observed
that editorials are ignored unless put in the form
of news or advertising. This indicates that the
advertorial may be even more desirable as a means of
expression than the publisher•s own format, the
editorial, since readers give at least equal attention
to news copy and to advertisements.59
One final advantage for using editorial advertising as an
access vehicle to the printed pres·s, has been found · to be

that its sale not only provides the advertiser with a forum
for expressing himself, but it also provides a "proportional amount of editorial space,n

60

Profit would be

realized by monetary gain as well as the opportunity for
the editor, or anyone opposed to the advertisement, to
print countervailing arguments enhancing free expression
dialogue.
Broadcast Media Access
The general trend for media access is some hat more

58
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complicated in the . broadcast industry than in the printed
. I

Such complic· t ions have arisen over conflicts
61 .
62
between the Communication Act, the Fairness Doctrine
press.

and the First Amendment.
Section 315 of the Communication Act specifically
l

provides access for political candidates, giving equal
opp·o rtunities to all public office seekers.

What has · been

commonly referred to as the "equal time" clause is applicable only if a licensee provides time to any one candidate.
Only then has the licensee been required tq ·offer the same
opportunities to opposing hopefuls.

Furthermore, Se.c t ion

315 excludes newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries,
and on-the-spot news covet-age from the realm Vlhich "equal
•

r

time« can apply.

Section 315 also does not include adver-

tising for political candidates as that which requires
equal opportunities.
· The Fairness DOctrine stemmed from the Federal Communication Commission's
by broadcast licensees,

investiga~ion

of editorializing

It states that persons or groups

holding views on issues of public importance that conflict
,.,ith those espoused by a licensee's commentary shall have
reasonable opportunity to reply.
A major criticism of the Fairness Doctrine, in

61

62

47

u.s .c. (1964).
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F.c.c. 1246 (1949).

J7

terms of free expression and access, has been that many
licensees simply avoid broadcasting commentaries on con63
.
'
troversial issues.
Rather than comply with the fairness
provisions and seek viewpoints opposing their commentaries,
broadcas~ers

do not comment ·a t all or comment on noncontro-

versial ma.t t.e rs.

Opponents of further broadcast access· through First
Amendment interpretations have suggested that Section 315
and the Fairness Doctrine are sufficient to satisfy t~e ·
64
constitutional requirements.
Proponents, on the other
hand, have suggested that

nei~her

the "equal time• clause

nor the Fairness Doctrine supply individuals with an

·opportunity to initiate expression; i.e., individuals or
groups must .wait until a licensee has commented on a controversial issue, or given time to a ·candidate, before
they even attempt to rebut.

65

The specific purpose of Section 315 has not compar-

atively elicited much argument by access advocates or
opponents.

The Fairness Doctrine. however, has been cited

66

by both camps in support of their arguments.
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.

The right of access to broadcast media was strongly
. .
.
. 67
supporte~ in Red Lion Broadcasting Co, v, F,C,C,
The
case involved a

perceiv~d

conflict between the First Amend.

ment and the Fairness Doctrine.

.

Specifically, broadcasters

argued that the Fairness Doctrine abr1dged their constitutional

~ights.

The Court, however, stateds

It is the right of the public to receive suitable
access to social, political. esthetic, moral, and other
ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That
right may not be constitutionally abridged either by
Congress or by the F,C,C.68
Not only did the Court define the public's right of
access, but also the obligations of broadcast licensees:
There is nothing in the First Amendment which
prevents the Government from requiring a licensee
to share his frequency with others and to conduct
himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations
to present those views and voices which are representative of his community and which ould otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.69

Jaffe revie' ed the Red Lion decision regarding the
dual issues of access and .fairness and wrote&
The Court held that the fairness doctrine, and ·
even a right to command time, is not only tolerated
by the first amendment but is required by it. · 'It
is the right of the vie ers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters which is paramount ••• •
·we must therefore conclude on the basis of the
pronouncements in Red Lion that the fairness
doctrine is in a somewhat loose sense a first

67
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amendment requirement.70
Access to broadcast media via . advertising has generally been regarded similar to· other attempts of securing
access.

Advertising.·. however. adds a dimension which has

made it somewhat more practical.
the

licens~~· -·

It produces revenue for

Editorial advertising specifically has

been offered as a means by which individuals could gain
access and broadcasters could gain money.
Broadcasters, however, have opposed this specific
use of editorial advertising for fear that groups or individuals opposed to a particular advertisement may demand
free time to reply on the basis of the Fairness Doctrine
71

as defined in Red· Lion·.

Jaffe commented on

t~t

argument by writing. "If adver-

torials engender fairness obligations, the number the broadcaster is required to take must be limited by some quota,
72
perhaps graded to his profit level."
Furthermore, as
will be seen in the legal review, there have been decisions
hich do not regard editorial advertising as "engendering" ·
?J
Fairness Doctrine obligations.
Finally, nothing has been stated in the Fairness

70
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Doctrine which specifically pertains to editorial advertising.
The closest statement to required access has been found in
Section 315, but as stated that applies only to political
And even if broadcasters had attempted to apply

candidates,

that Section to editorial advertisements, the only thing

they would . be
required to do is to give opponents to a
- -·
·-

particular advertisement art equal opportunity to buy time
for their own advertisement • .
Access To Other Media
Access to media othe.r than newspapers, radio, and
television and for the expression. of opinion has been found

t

be 1 ss controversial.

The other media include community

-a ntenna television (CATV) and public transportation facilities; e.g., buslines, subways, taxio b companies, etc.
Access to CATV ·hae been spelled out by specific regulation under authority of the Federal Communication Commission.
In this regulation the Commission has stateda

cable systems in major television markets shall
maintain at least one specially designated, noncommercial public access channel available on a firstcome, nondiscriminatory basis. · The system shall
maintain and have available for public use at
least the minimal equipment and facilities necessary
for the production and pro.g ramming for such
channel.74
Access to public transportation facilities has been
exclusively through the purchasing of advertising space
on such facilities.

Access to these facilities, as out-

74
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lined in the legal review, ha·s been recognized due to their
common carrier status.
The philo·sophy of a right of access to mass media,

as ari extension of the First

Amend~ent,

has achieved some

recognition as a valid interpretation for contemporary
free

expre~~~Qn~.

This philosophy has also been opposed,

particularly by those in .the broadcast media, on grounds .
that its manifestations would impinge

~on

the parallel

rights of the press, · both print and broadcast.
This philosophy,

~~hile

being controversial, has,

nevertheless, helped establish percedent for more practical
means of gaining access while maintaining both individual
rights of expression and press freedoms.

Specifically,

editorial advertising has been suggested as a vehicle which
could eliminate the present paradox of conflicting First
Amendment rights.
MANIFESTATIONS OF EDITORIAL ADVERTISING
Print Media

One of the primary examples of editorial advertising
found in print media and one of the most notorious was
printed in the New York Times on March 29, 1960.

The

advertisement was headlined "Heed Their Rising Voices" and
75
accused Alabama officials of mistreating Negroes.
It
listed, by lengthy copy, a number of grievances and urged

75

See Appendix for complete ad.
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readers to support its cause.
This example was an expression of opinion by a group
known as "Committee To Defend Martin Luther King And The
Struggle For Freedom In The South."

It also involved a

controversiat issue, racial discrimination. · It was
accepted by -the Times and paid by the Committee which was

the identified sponsor.
A second

e~a~ple

was reported to have been printed in
76
the December 15, 196) New York Times.
This advertisement was entitled MThe Time Has Come" and was sponsored
by the John Birch Society.

It was a full page, paid

espousal of that organizations beliefs.
The most recent example of editorial advertising in
newspapers was published in the Times on October 14, 1973.
The headline read, · "Why it is necessary to impeach President
!

Nixon.

And how it can be done. ••

The copy, like that of

the first example, was a long dissertation listing specific
grievances as reasons for the action suggested by the
headline.

This advertisement also urged readers to

support the opinion of the sponsors and the sponsors
themselves.

The American Civil Liberties Union was respon-

sible for the creation and funding.

77
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Editorial, The New York Times, December 20, 1963,
p. 28, Col, 2.
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The New York Times, October 14, 1973, p. 14 E.
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Broadcast Media ·

Examples of editorial advertising in broadcast media
have been difficult to locate.

There has, however, been

one distinct case of national notoriety.

The advertisement

in this example was never broadcast, but it was prepared for
broadcasting .- b·y a

responsib~e

organization that was willing

to pay for all time required.
The organization was known as Business Executives Move
for .Vietnam Peace and had prepared a series of sixty second
spot announcements "urging immediate withdrawal of American
forces from Vietnam and from othe.r .overseas military
. 78
installations ...

In addition to the sixty second spots, there ·were also
ten, twenty, and thirty second announcements.
of these "commercials" varied.

The contents

The opinion that the rela-

tive loss of life due to immediate withdrawal would be far
less than that incurred by continuous policies expressed
a criticism of specific administrative action.

Also

expressed within the advertisements, were the opinions that
the War was "morally corrupt, politically .

inept~

and

militarily stupid:" that the War was causing domestic
upheaval; that our "allies" were not representative of their

population:

Vietnamization would only "prolong" the c.on-

flict; that saving lives was more important than •saving
face; • that .o ur presence in the conflict was humiliating:
"withdrawal must be total;" that some arguments for con-

78 25 F.c.c. 2d., p. 242.

tinued cofl\flict were steeped · in "ps.e udo-patriotism"t and

.

that the entire foreign policy should be reformed,

79

Another example found in broadcast media was reported
by Advertising

~.

At the time of the report the adver-

tisement had not been aired, but plans for an entire campaign had alre·a dy been completed.

These ads were to be

broadcast in Canada urging the support of a particular
religio·us belief.

The article stated: .

Pope Paul VI will be heard on 18 Frenchlanguage radio stations throughout the Quebec
province on october 18, 19 and 20 in 6o· s.econd
(paid) spots for the local office of the Church·' s
Propagation of the Faith. The Pope is · being
used 'in order to put the weight of .the ~apacy
behind renewed efforts by the office• to promote
·Catholicism and ask people ~o work actively for
the betterment of human condi~i6ns in general. 80
Other Media
Other media in which editorial advertisements have
been manifested were outdoor or public transportation
vehicles which provide advertising space.
examples were found.

Two specific

Legal cases resulted in both

instances, but after decisions were rendered 0 the advertisements were placed.
The first example was found in September of 1964,

An organization known as Women for Peace :created and

79
80

Ibid •• p. 243.

Advertising ~~. "Pope Paul in Radio Ads for Quebec
Group,", October 15, 1973. p. 2,
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sponsored an advertisement urging an end to the Vietnam
War.

The message read as follows&
'Mankind must put an end. to war
or war will put ~n end to mankind.'
President John F. Kennedy
Write to President Johnson•

Negotiate Vietnam.

Women for Peace
81
.p. o. Box 944, Berkeley,

This advertisement had been planned for placement on
the buses operated by the Alameda-Contra Costa Transit
District.
The second example was of a similar nature.

It was

sponsored by Students for a Democratic Society. · It was
created by an advertising agency and · scheduled to show on
New York subways.

The mes·sage read:

WHY ARE WE BURNING, TORTURING, KILLING
THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM? TO PREVENT
FREE ELECTIONS.
PROTEST this anti-democratic war.
WRITE President Lyndon Johnson, The White House, .
Washington D.C.
GET THE STRAIGHT FACTS, · WRITE
Students for a Democratic Society
119 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003
82
This 10-year old girl was burned by napalm bombs.
LEGAL STATUS OF EDITORIAL ADVERTISINGa
REVIEW OF CASES

The use of editorial advertising has been sparse
in comparison with commercial advertising.

Reasons for

81

Wirta v ·. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District,
64 Cal Rptr. 432 (1967),

Kiss.ing~r v :.
S upp.
~J~ l~DNY
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its lack of use include unawareness of its potential by
the ·general public and opposition from those who control
various media.
Some of the examples in the previous section were
opposed by the media for business reasons.
lead

to

lega±~attles

That opposition

which have formed the basic prece-

dents for editorial advertising in general.
If editorial advertising is to be used further in .
order to maintain free expression, then a review of all
relevant legal decisions is imperative.
Print Media
The main precedent for editorial advert.ising in print
. 83
was established in New York Time§ Company v. Sull.ivan.
The facts of the case were as follows.
A New York advertising agency was paid by the "Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for
Freedom in the South" to create an advertisement (see

previous section) which listed actions by the Montgomery,
Alabama Police Department as grievances .

The ad went into

great detail to explain why readers should support the
Committee, Dr. King, and the civil rights movement in

general.

As a result of the advertisement, Montgomery

City Commissioner L. B. Sullivan brought suit for libel
against those persons listed in the message and against

83

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 111 ed.
2d 686, 84 S Ct 710 (1964).

the New York Times, · An Alabama Court awarded Sullivan
$500,000.00

in damages • . The case was

Alabama . Supreme Court

up~eld

~ppealed and the

the decision.

The adver-

tisers and the Times then appealed tb the United . States
Supreme Court.

The Court, in a unanimous decision§ rever-

sed the Alabama Courts and held that the Alabama law was
"constituti_o nally deficient" regarding First

protections and "evidence presented was
.
84
insufficient.. "

Amen~ment

constit~tionally·

The maj,ority of arguments presented. to the Court centered on the issue of libel and free expression.

One

section of the decision did focus on editorial advertising

_w ithin this

cont~xt

.of

pr~tected spee~h.

The Court. stated'

Where an allegedly libelous· statement appeared
in a newspaper advertisement Which communicated .
information, expressed opinion~ recited grievances,
protested claimed abuses of Negro students protesting
against segregation, and sought financial support
on behalf of the movement against racial discrimination, the allegedly libelous statement did not forfeit its protection under the constitutional guaranty
of freedom of sp~ech · and press merely because the
newspaper was paid for publishing the advertisement.,,any other conclusion,.ewould thus have the
effect of shackling the First A·mendment in its
attempt to secure the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources,85

This statement by the Supreme Court, in conjunction
with the statement on page 25 of this report,
84 rbid,

8511 L ed 2d 698 (1964).
86
cr. supra, p.25, emphasis added.

86

clearly

48
defined the legal status of editorial advertising as another
form for free expression within the print media.
Broadcast Media
Legal

op~nions

on the status of editorial advertising

in broadcast media have been diverse and contrary.

It was

necessary, · for this reason, to review each case more closely
and to .consider all opinions, concurring and dissenting. ·
Initial Cases.

The specific issue of using editorial

advertisements in these media first arose when Business
Executives• Move for Vietnam Peace (BEM) filed a complaint,
with the Federal Communications Commission 0 against radio
station WTOP AM (Post-Newsweek Stations, Capital Area,
Inc.)
by

-

87

The complaint was the result of repeated refusals

WTOP to accept the editorial advertisements of BEM.
BEM, on three separate occasions:

June 1969, July

1969, and January 1970, attempted to purchase advertising
time from WTOP .in order to persuade public opinion against
88

Vietnam policy.
January 22

WTOP refused all attempts· and on

1970, BEM filed its complaint alleging that the

station's actions violated the Fairness Doctrine; infringed
on the public's right to hear contrasting views;
and violated the First Amendment by suppressing free

87

25 F.c.c. 2d., p. 242.

88

Cf, supra, p. 43.

speech,

BEM further asked the Commission to force WTOP
89
to accept their advertisements.
WTOP responded to the complaint by first stating that

it had refused the advertisements because they antagonized
its policy of not accepting controversial matter.
furthe·r

sta~~~-

They

that they had acted within all rules, regu-

lations, and guidelines established by ·the Commission and
the National Association of B.r oadcasters.
The Commission,

af~er

90

hearing both arguments, cata-

gorized its decision according to the allegations made in
I

the complaint.

The first

catego~y

the Fairness Doctrine violations.

.in its decision regarded
The Commission agreed

with BEM that the Vietnam War was, indeed, a controversial
issue.

In their opinion, however, they found

~ffOP's

news coverage and programming to be sufficient to satisfy
Fairness Doctrine requirements.

The Commission, thus,

dismissed the complaint on that particular allegatio_n.
The second category of the complaint, regarding the
public's right to hear controversial issues was attended to
more quickly than the first.

BEM's argument in support of

this allegation rested on an earlier Supreme Court decision
in the case of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. Y•· .

F.C.~.

which

stated the "right of the public to receive suitable access

89
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90
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.

to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas."
The Commission dismissed this · allegation by stating,

91

"Inas~

much as WTOP appears to have presented •representative· .
community views• on the issues here in question, we find
that it has not acted contrary to the principles laid ·
down in Red

~Lion

...

92

The third category of the complaint, alleging suppression of free expression, was also based on the Red Lion
decision and it t ·oo was subsequently dismissed by the
Commission.

With all

t~ree cat~gories

of BEM'·s complaint

dismissed as being either too general or .. misinterpretive .
of earlier decisions, the Commission denied BEM's request
to have its advertisements broadcast. ·
There was, however, one . dissenting opinion, that of
Commissioner Nicholas Johnson who wrote an extensive,
detailed criticism of the Commission's decision.
Johnson held the

opi~ion

Mr.

that the main issue of the hearing

had been overlooked.

The issue, therefore, is not what policy
the Commission might wish to adopt concerning
the •advertisements' b fore us, but what the 93
· Constitution requires the Commission to adopt.
He continued his reasoning by stating that the Commission
had ignored "a long line of judicial precedent which
guarantees •• oa right of access to forums generally open

91 . .
Cf •

92
93

supra, P• 38.

25 F.c.c.

2d, p. 243.

Ibid., p. 250.

..
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to the public for expression of views. ••

94

Mr. Johnson then

stated what he believed to be the four main issues of
the case.

The first one, considering the protection of

advertising as free speech, was relevant to this review.
· Mr. Johnson listed some of the forementioned precedents regarding advertising and free speech and then
stateds
Although the distinction drawn is an elusive one,
it divides, perhaps, speech which seeks to influence ·
political and social decisions in the marketplace
of id~as from speech which seeks to influence private economic decisions in the marketplace of goods
and services.95
He concluded his comments on this issue by suggesting
that WTOP and the Commission had "relegated political and
social speech to an inferior role .. by preferring commer96
cial advertising to editorial advertising.
He contra1

dieted the Commission's decision by stating, "BEM's antiwar advertisements are 'speech' deserving of First Amend97
ment protect ion."
'

A related case, also involving the purchase of time

for expression of opinion, was organized by the Democratic
National Committee (DNC),

The DNC had attempted to purchase

network television time in order to present an issue-oriented
9 4 Ibid,, p. 251.
95

96
97

Ibid • , p •

2 52 •

Ibid.
Ibid • , p • 2 53 ,
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program designed to comment on controversial issues and also
designed to solicit funds.

98

The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) ·r ejected the
request for time on the grounds that no elections were in
progress.
did grant

The National Broadcasting Company (NBC), however
p~c~ ·

request for time.

The American Broadcasting

Company (ABC) refused to sell their time on the grounds of
its general policy prohibiting monetary appeal for pur-

.

99

poses other than charitable.
On May 19, 1970, the DNC filed a request with the
Federal Communications Commission that general policies of
the television networks, regarding the sale of time for
expression of opinion, be made nationally uniform in order
to facilitate campaign and media planning.

The DNC speci-

fically sought a d.eclarat ion that "'A broadcaster may not,
as a general policy, refuse to sell time . to responsible
entities, such as DNC, for the solicitation of funds and
100

for comment on public issues. '"

The DNC, like BEM, based its arguments on the Red Lion
decision which, according to the DNC, nreaffirmed the
public's First Amendment right to hear contrasting views

98

Democratic National Committee, Federal Communications
Commission Reports, 25 F.c.c. 2d, 1970, p. 216.
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on issues of public importance and 'employed language that
would extend to members of the public the right of access
101
to broadcast facilities.' .. .

The DNC qualified their argument by suggesting that
such access be regulated by the Commission and be given to
responsible _gt'Qups.

The DNC also pointed out that· it was

not seeking to require acceptance of any particular program, but only that arbitrary barriers to access are con102

trary to the public interest.
ABC, ·in response to the DNC•s request before the
Commission, altered its position • . It stated that, in
the final analysis, the DNC was attempting to fortify a
two party system and therefore its request fit into ABC's
103
category of "special public interest consideration."
CBS. ·however, maintained its refusal and counter-

argued by stating that its policies&
insure full and fair presentation of such issues;
that a regulatory policy which imposes common carrier
obligations would be contrary to the public interest:
there was no constitutional or statutory right to
compel broadcasters to carry the DNC programs and:
such obligation would be contrary to the Communications
Act and Commission precedent.104
CBS proceeded to justify its claims by suggesting that

101
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implementat~on

of such requests . woUld "radically alter the

nature of broadcasting and be a detriment . to fair, objective
and balanced information to the listening public ·. "
.

CBS
.

also suggested that selling t .ime for . pub~ic issues would
preempt the "limited bro-adcast frequencies and allo
~hey

rich groups · to- distort issues."

those

finally stated "The

First Amendment is primarily co·ncerned with the right of
the public . to be ·inform d .. as o·pposed to the right of the
.

.. 10:5

public to speak or to be heard."

The .Gommission, in the course of its decision,
analyzed both the DNC and CBS .arguments.

The Commission

concluded that CBS' argument rested on the "assertion that
no particular group or person has .the right to spea k over
106

broadcast facilities."

.
T·hey continued their analysis

of charges and countercharges and separated their final
decision into two parts.

Part one regarded the right of

political parties to purchase time for solicitation.

Part

two regard.e d the right of responsible entities to buy time
for opinion expression.

The Commission passed judgment on

part two first.
The Commission's decision on part two of the DNC

request began by emphasizing that such a requests
goes to the heart of the ·system of broadcasting
which has developed in this country; i.e., the
licensing of private entities under the public
interest standard. While the issues raised by ·the
DNC are fundamental, they are not open. They
105
Ibido

106

Ibid. • p. 221.
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have long been settled adversely to the DNC position ••• 107
The Commissioh also stated that due to the Unique
nature of broadcast frequencies, "some who wish to use it
. 108

must be denied."

They continued in that vein by citing

the Red Lion decision as supporting the view that nobody
has the right to access.

They also were finally careful

to point out that there was no specific policy which actually
prohibited the sale of time on public issues.

"Licensees

are free to do so, with the caveat that the fairness
109

doctrine ••• must be observed."
The Commission's decision in part one, regarding fund
raising, basically concurred with the new position taken
by ABC; i.e.,

~hey

found purchasing time for solicitation

to be acceptable because-it was ultimately in the public
interest.
The Commission, in conclusion, stated, "In view of the
foregoing, the re·quest of the DNC and ABC for a declara'

tory ruling IS GRANTED, to the extent reflected in part
110
II and all other respects, IS DENIED."
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What· .was ·· .concluded, in
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.

essence, was that certain paid

~nn~unc~ments

asking for

money were acceptable, but those commenting on controversial
issues were not.
The major implications, derived from the BEM and the

DNC hearings. before the .Federal Communications . Commission,
were that e4ito-rial advertisements cannot be forced upon
broadcasters; advertising time and program time were considered synonymous: advertis·e ments for political financial
solicitation were acceptable provided that there were no
controversial issues contained

ithin them; licensees

may acc.e pt editorial advertisements if they choose, being

cognizant that fairness implications might ariser and it
is the judgment of the licensee that is paramount in defining .. controversial issues of public importance,"
Appellate Cases.

On March 9, 1971, both BEM and the

DNC appealed the decision of the Communications Commission
· to the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Circuit, which generally hears appeals of .this nature.
The petitioners (BEM and the DNC) argued that the
Commission's decision in the previous hearings tacitly
permitted a general broadcaster policy of banning all con111

troversial editorial advertising from the air.
The Circuit Court reversed the Commission's decision
and remanded the cases for

furthe~

study.

The reasons for

the reversal applied specifically to editorial advertising
as b-e ing protected by the First Amendment.
ferentiated between advertising

They also dif-

ime and general program-

57
ming time,

The Commission's decisions were largely based .

on Fairness .Doctrine interpretations as applied to general
programming,
The Court's reasoning began by referring to that
differentiation.
The . principle at.stake here ••• concerns the
people's right to engage in and to. hear vigorous
public debate on broadcast media. More spe9ifically, it concerns the application of that right
to the substant.i al portion of the broadcast day
which is sold for advertising ••• For too long
advertising has been considered a virtual free
fire zone, largely ungoverned by regulatory
guidelines ••• ll2
. The Court continued its disagreement, referring to
the Commission's argument that acceptance of editorial
advertising would strike at the "heart" of the broadcasting
system

a~d

cause chaos,

The Court pointed out that the

issue was specific .and not one of radical change.

The.

Court reassured the Commission and broadcasters by stating&
· ••• we leave undisturbed the licensee's basic right
to exercise judgment and control in public issue
programming and the sale of ·a dvertising time. All we
do forbid is an extreme form of control which totally
excludes public debate from broadcast advertising
time .113
In essence, the Court was directing its decision

against a flat ban on editorial advertising.

It further

suggested that the Commission develop "reasonable regulations," as quickly as possible, that would determine which

112
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and how many editorial advertisements would be broadcast.

114

The Court, in support of its reasoning, .stressed First
Amendment interpretations more and Fairness Doctrine
applications less.
Commission, _ ~~~ed

tation.

The Court, like BEM, the DNC, and the
the Red Lion case, adding its interpre-

They quoted the Supreme Court's decision by saying,

"the people as a whole retain their collective right to
have the medium function consistently with the ends and
purpose of the First Amendment."

115

The Circuit Court also held .a technical view of the
broadcast media but added that the media was "our foremost
forum for public speech" and by its very nature "plays an
absolutely crucial role in the process of s·elf-governnlent
116
and free expression."

The Court continued its categorical disagreement with
related aspects of the co·m mission 's standpoint.

The Com-

mission purported that the Fairness Doctrine was sufficient
to observe First Amendment rights, but the Court stated

that, due to the special nature of advertising, the Com-

mission should reconsider,

was twofold.

The essence of that remanding

First,

when an individual or group buys time to say

114
Ibid.

115

Ibid •• p. 650.

116
Ibid •• pp.

653-54.
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its piece, the crucial controls are in its own
hands. Editorial advertising is thus a special
and separate mode of expression, ·not simply a
duplication of other expression on the same
medium.117
Second, the Court stated that the use of editorial advertising allowed groups and individuals to actively express
118
themselves;_ .i.-e. • "to take the initiative,"

This

reasoning was furthered by invoking the First Amendment
idea of free and vigorous debate coupled with the traditional idea that the best judge of expressing an opinion
is the person or group who holds that opinion.
The Court criticized the Commission

on

this point by

The present system, allowing a flat ban on .
ed·i to rial advertising, -conforrns instead to a

paternalistic structure in which licensees and
bureaucrats decide what issues are 'important•
h·ow 'full~,-' to· cover them and the format, time
and style of coverage.119
The Court then concluded its discussion on Fairness Doctrine sufficiency by stating that it did not "eliminate the
public's interest in a further, complementary airing of
120
controversial views ·during advertising time,"
The Circuit Court also touched on the issue of access
citing five cases as precedent,
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These included Wirta Y.•.

121
Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District . and Kissinger v·.
122
New York City Transit Authority.
The main argument

60

taken from both of those ca.s es was that of previously opened
forum.

The Court, while recognizing no common carrier

obligations for broadcasters,

~evertheless

suggested that

by ope.n ing the-ir forum to some ·paid advertisements, the
no~

broadcasters could
just because

~hey

discriminate against other types

were of controversial tone.

They con-

cluded:
, •• the editorial advertising ban, particularly
when licensees accept advertising generally,.establishes an unmistakable infringing of First Amendment liberties.123
The Court finally reiterated the Commission and
licensee arguments.

It countered each with its own, taking

a constitutional view and then concluded by statings
In the end, it may unse·ttle some of us to see an
anti-war message ·or a political party message in
the accustomed place of a soap or beer commercial.
But we must not equate what is habitual with what
is right - or what is constitutional. A society
already so saturated with commercialism can well
afford another outlet for speech on public issues.
All that we may lose is some of our apathy ••• 124

There was a dissenting opinion in this appellate case.
Circuit Judge McGowan disagreed with the majority opinion

121
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on the practicality of the

rema~ding.

He suggested that

the task of formulating "reasonable regulations" · for editorial advertising was more difficult
realized,

~han

the majorit.y

He also stated that he nwas not convinced that

the Constitution required the Commission to perform such
125
a task."

. -He· suggested finally that the Commission review

editorial advertising

wh~n

it reviewed the operation of the

Fairness Doctrine, and added, "I would not order the

.

Commission to undertake that review in a constitutional
126
strait jacket which dictates the results in advance,"
The major implications for editorial advertising that
came ·from the appellate cases were that advertising time
is differentiated from general programming; the Fairness
,

Doctrine does not eliminate complementary public debate
in advertising timer a flat ban on editorial advertising
is unconstitutional when other advertising is. allowed;
and a system of regulating the use of editorial advertising
should be established with the licensees still controlling
the time, manner, and place of such advertising.

Supreme Court Decision.

On

~Ay

29o 1973, the United

States Supreme Court rendered its decision on the controversial BEM case and the status of editorial advertising in

125
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broadcast media.

In a seven ·t o two dec_isior1, the Supreme

Court held that "neither the Communications Act nor the
First Amendment required broadcasters to accept paid
127

editorial advertisements."

Thi~

decision

revers~d

the

one of the Circuit Court and somewhat reinstated the decision of the Federal Communications Commission.
The Court based part of its reasoning on legislative
intent stating, "Congress has consistently rejected efforts
to impose on broadcasters a •common carrier' right of access
for all persons wishing to speak on public issues."

128

The Court was, of course, referring to the Communications
Act and continued its reasoning by saying, "The 'public
interest I standard of the c·ommunications Act. which incorporates the First Amendmentf does not require broadcasters
129

to accept editorial advertisements."

The Court

a~so

believed that to implement the system

suggested by the appellate court would risk that system

to monopoly by those who would pay the cost.

130

They

further stated that such a system would be . too impractical
131

for the Commission to handle effectively.
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All of

~he

previous

reasoning~ howe~er,

was based on

the Supreme· Court • s interpretation that each licensee
maintains "journalistic discretion" to meet its statut.ory
and public obligations.
referred to this concept.

The Court · throughout its decision
It stateda

The lic~nsee policy challenged in this case is
ultimately related to the journalistic role of a
licensee for V~hich it has been given ·initial and
primary responsibility by Congress, The ·licensee's
policy against accepting editorial advertising c.annot
be examined as an abstract proposition, but . must be
viewed in the context of this jou~nalistic role •••
Moreover, the Commission has not fostered the licensee
policy challenged here; it has simply declined to command
particular action because it fell within the area of
journalistic discretion.132
The Court continued in this vein when reasoning against
the argument that broadcaster policy and Commission approval constituted "state action .. thus allowing First
Amendment application via the Fourteenth Amendment.

The

Court said s
· ••• it would be anomalous for us to hold, in the
name of promoting the constitutional guarantees
of free .expression, that the day-to-day editorial
decisions of broadcast licensees ~re subject to
the kind of restraints urged by respondents. To
do so in the name of the First mendment would be
. a contradiction. Journalistic discretion would
in many ways be lost to the rigid limita.t ions that
the First Amendment imposes on government... We
therefore conclude that the policies complained of

1)2
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do not constitute governmental action violative of
the First Amendment.133
The Supreme Court, agreeing with the McGowan dissent,
appel~ate

criticized the
remanding

t~e

court . for being unrealistic in

case to the Communication Commission.

This

criticism was centered on the fact that· such a remanding
would have

the

effect of increasing .. government·a l control

over the content of broadcast discussion of public issues."
The Court ·also rebuked appe-llate court statements that
licensee policy was discriminatory in favor of commercial
advertising.

It did so by discounting the.cases cited by

the appellate court that called for open public forum.
It differentiated those cases from the present one by
citing the differences between public property, public
transportation facilities, and broadcast facilities,

It

there i -s no 'discrimination• again·s t
135
controversial speech present in this case."
concluded 1

"• ••

There were two dissenting opinions in this decision,
Justices Brennan and Marshall generally opposed ·_ the
decision of the majority to uphold the denial of editorial advertising.-

133
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This • they said, inhibited robust
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and wideopen debate thus violating the First Amendment.
Justice Brennan wrote for both Justices and divided
the opinion into four areas, addressing the main points
of the majority

opinion~

The four areas pertained to

.

.

government involvement, Fairness

Doct~ine

and journalistic

discretion, bal.a ncing First Amendment interests, and
criticism of majority's fears elicittrl by the implementation
of a regulatory scheme for editorial

~dvertising.

The First Amendment can only apply to situations
where the government or .its agencies have abridged free
expression.

This test has · also been extended to state

and local governments by means of the Fourteenth Amendment.

A critical segment of this case was whether or not

the licensees, supported by the Communications Cownission,
were government agencies or fiduciaries.-,

Justice

Brennan reminded the majority of five indicia which linked
licensees with the government,

includeda

Briefly, these indicia

public "ownership" of the airwaves as esta-

blished by the Communications Act; dependence of broadcasters on the governmental control over the broadcast
- industryJ specific
by

gov~rnmental

involvement in this case

means of Commission's ruling and Fairness Doctrine

interpretations; and specific precedent in the case of
1)6

Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak.

136
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Justice Brennan, in the · second area · of his dissent,
point~d

out the inadequacies of the Fairness Doctrine

in relation to .editorial advertising and concluded that
it could not, in this case, provide, ·w ide open debate, .
He

stateda
As a practical matter, the Cour~•s reliance on
the Fairness Doctrine as an 'adequate• alternative
to editorial advertising seriously overestimates
the ability - or willingness - of broadcasters to
expose the public to the 'widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources•.,., in the commercial world of mass communications~ it is simply bad business to espouse or even to allow others to espouse - the heterodox
or the controversial. As a result, even under the
Fairness Doctrine, broadcasters generally tend to
permit only established - or at least moderated views to enter broad~ast world's 'marketplace of
ideas. '137

He concluded by stating that the Fairness Doctrine was
necessary to . broadcast regulation, but that its mere
existence "cannot eliminate the need for a further, complementary airing of controversial views through the
limited availability of editorial advertising,"

138

The third area of the dissent d"e alt with balancing
the First Amendment rights of the broadcasters, listeners
and· viewers, and access seekers,

Justice Brennan sug-

gested that the First Amendment safeguarded those who
wanted to "participate" in

~ebate

as well as "hear" it.

He stated that this was particularly true nowadays because

137
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of increased "anonymity." ·

He further suggested that

this case dealt with advertising time, an area in which
broadcasters do not normally have great editorial control.
He supported the ideas of "open forumM and held that ·there
wasJ indeed, discrimination in this case.

He also

pointed out the - irony of this case; i.e., traditionally,
controversial -s peech had been protected by the Consti-

tution,

wherea~

commercial speech had not.

He then

concluded'
Balancing those interests against the limited
interest of broadcasters in exercising 'journalis-t ic
supervision• over the mere allocation of advertising
time that is already made available to some members
of the public, I simply cannot conclude that the
interest of the broadcasters must prevail.140

Justice Br.ennan finally addressed the major fears
held by the Court.

Those fears were:

an editorial·

advertising system might favor the wealthya application

of the Fairness Doctrine might adversely affect itself;
regulation of editorial advertising might increas~ govern141
His reply to these fears
ment control of broadcasting.
was short.

He suggested that, in light of his previous

arguments, editorial advertising should be given an op-
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portunity.

He wrote, "We simply have no sure way of

~nowing

whether, and to what extent if any, these poten.
.
142
tial difficulties will actually materialize." ·
The major implications for editorial advertising in
the broadcast media derived from this Supreme Court decision were

th~t-

_neither .the Communications Act nor the ·

First Amendment requires broadcasters to accept such advertising.

Licensees are not common carriers, therefore

advertisers have no right of access.
An extensive dissenting opinion attempted to show
that editorial advertising was protected by the First

Amendment and would not disrupt licensee's journalistic
discretion when being used to complement Mrobust" and
"wideopen" debate.
Other Media
Le.gal opinions on editorial advertising in other

media have been largely confined to that space sold for
advertising purpo s es by public transportation companies.
Like print media, definite precedents have been established
and little controversy has risen.
Two decisions, noted earlier, helped establish this
precedent.
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Ibid.

One of these was Wirta v

0

,

Alameda-Contra Costa

. 143
Transit District,

This decision involved an organization

known as Women For Peace who attempted to place antiwar
advertisements on local bus card space.
The advertising agency, representing the transit.

company, refused to sell the space to the organization
becaus·e of its policy rejecting advertising· of a contro..:.

"144
versial nature,

The Supreme Court of California held that the "content
of the advertisement in question is undeniably protected
by

the First Amendment,"

They continued to state that

just because the message was paid for did not mean that
it was not in the realm of protected speech.

The Court

also dismissed the busline•s arguments stating that the
c.ompany had already allowed advertising and it was a
public utility.

It therefore could not deny that its
145
buses were a forum for free speech.
The Court conceded that the company could regulate
the time, place, and manner, but also saids
Transit advertising . is an acceptable and effective
means of communication. A regulation which permits
those who offer goods and services for sale and those
who wish to express ideas relating to elections
access to such forum while d€nying it to those who
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desire to express other ideas and beliefs, protected
by the First Amendment, cannot be upheld.t46
Based on this decision, t ·he Court affirmed an injunction which permitted . Women For Peace to place their message,
The other precedent for editorial advertising came in
Kissinger v,

.

r

-New York City Transit Authority,

147

a case

which considered the sale of advertising space in local
subway systems.
The subway system refused to. place the posters of
Students For a Democratic · Society because they violated
their acceptance policies, being controversial and "offen
.
148
siv.e to good taste."
Although not ruling on the case, Judge Bonsal of
District Court of New York stated:
Plaintiff's poste~~ are an expression of political
views. They are not obscene or profane. Consequently,
the Authority and the Advertising Company cannot
refuse to accept the posters for display unless the
posters present a serious and immediate threat to
the safe ahd efficient operation of the subways •••
(furthermore) they cannot refuse to accept the posters for display because· they are •entirely too
controversial ••• •t49
The Court concluded -by saying that the "Authority and the
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Advertising Oompany cannot accep~ · some ·posters ·~nd refuse
plaintiff's for reasons that conflict with the First
150

Amendment."

These two cases clearly define the use of editorial
advertising in media supported by public utilities,

All

First Amendment rights pertained to opinion advertisements
in these media,

Furthermore, the precedent of open public

forum was developed to entail this type of advertising.
SUMMARY

The use of editorial advertising to maintain free
expression has relied heavily on the philosophy that the
First Amendment provides access to the media.

Proponents

of this philosophy have suggested that the First Amendment
be interpreted to include a right of access because contemporary applications of it have been paradoxical; i.e.,
media have used their right of free press to pursue business and suppress individual free speech.

Opponents to

a right of access believed that the media and not the
government, or people, should promote access,
Editorial advertising has been used in the print
media to express opinions.
United States Supreme Court,

This use was supported by the
Examples appeared in large

daily newspapers and school newspapers.

150
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The use of editorial advertising in broadcast media
has been debated

ex~ensively.

Some licensees have refused

it and stated that its acceptance would hurt their business
because opponents would demand free reply time.

This

refusal policy was declared unconstitutional by an appellate court, but generally upheld by the United States
Supreme Court.
Opinion advertisements have .been used in other media
such as bus . company card space and subway station posters.
These uses have been declared c.onstitutional by state courts
due to the concepts of "open public forum" and "governmental
fiduciaries."

Chapter 4
ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSIONS
The constitutional background of a free expression
system has been examined and the modern institution of
advertising has been suggested as an aid in maintaining
that system in a rapidly advancing, technological society.
Editorial advertising has been suggested
as the specific
.
.
tool to accomplish free expression.. Its uniqueness has
been discussed in relation to other forms of advertising
and editorializing.

Its uses have been seen and its legal

status reviewed,
There are, however, a few questions remaining concerning the future use of editorial advertising,

First,

what are the paramount issues surrounding the continued
and expanded use of editorial advertising?

If its use is

to be expanded, then how might it be implemented to fit
into existing mass media?

Finally, what aspects of edi-

torial advertising and its use for free expression need
further research?
PARAMOUNT ISSUES

There is very little doubt that editorial advertising
can be used to communicate opinions.

The crucial issue,

however, is whether or not the "gatekeepers" will sell

7J
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their space or time so that the advertisements may be exposed

to the public.

The question of media access was discussed

initially in Chapter 3, but at this point those arguments
must be reconsidered within the context of the first two
chapters.
Print Media
Access to newspapers via editorial advertising, as
shown in Chapter

J, has generally been accepted as a result

of Times v • . Sullivan and Zucker v •. Panitz.

This accep-

tability must not, however, be construed as a right of
access.

Editors still retain the right to refuse adver- .

tising of any nature.

151

The right to refuse advertising _has usually been
expressed in newspapers·• business policies, and varies
from paper to paper.

Specific reaction to the acceptance

'

of various editorial advertisements was the subject of a
recent survey.
~he

152

The results showed that while some of

papers would accept some of the editorial ads, all

papers emphasized their ultimate right to refuse.

153

These general policies are best expressed by an
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152
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excerpt from the "Advertising Acceptability Guide" of
the Chicago Tribune.
tro~ersial

It states, "'Advertising

of a con-

nature is ·acceptable only if approved. by a

.

Tribune divisional advertising manager,'"
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Other n_e'!V_s_papers, like the New York Times, have
expressed their general right to refuse, but have also .

-

specifically stated the need to· apply the First Amendment

to advert is in~.

The Times has stated, ·

••• The Times believes that, in furtherance of the
objectives of the First Amendment of the Constitution,
it should keep its advertising columns open to all
points of view, no matter how strongly it disapproves .
of them.
Subject of course to the laws of libel and the
bounds of decency and good taste and the requirements
of factual accuracy, we think the principle of freedom
.of the press not only requires us to report events and
occurrances of which we disapprove e ... but als. o imposes
on us the obligation to accept advertising of books
whose contents we reject and of politi~al parties
and movements whose goals we despise,
· The guarantees of the First Amendment are not
mere guarantees of the publishers' right to publish,
They are, more importantly, guarantees of the public's
right to know, We consider that that is what a free
press truly meanss the maintenance of open communication in the realm of ideas.155
Since this editorial was printed, advertising of
controversial opinions was directly supported by the
Times v • . Sullivan decision.
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advertisements containing libelous statements did not
detract from the ma~ issue of free expression.

Further-

more, there is some evidence that only the advertiser .may
156
be held libel and not the vehicle ~f communication.
Access to the newspapers will

prob~bly

continue to

be the crucial .hurdle for opinion advertisers.

However,

due to the reduced risk of libel suits against publishers;
the

publishers~

knowledge that they ultimately retain the

right to refuser and the increased incidence of court
decisions recognizing editorial advertisements as free
speech, it appears that opinion advertisements will, for
all practical purposes, increasingly continue to be

~ccep-

ted thus lowering the hurdle.
Broadcast Media
The main issues that have emerged from attempts to
buy air time for opinion advertising have been, like· print

media, access and competing constitutional rights.
Broadcasters, as seen in Chapter J, have considered
themselves to be part of the "press" and thus entitled
to First Amendment protections from government interference.
They are, unlike printed

agency.

m~dia,

regulated by a federal

This dual nature has created a complex problem

for the licensee and anyone who wishes access for free

156
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speech purposes.

Results of this complex problem were

seen in the extended review of those cases involving access
for editorial advertising.

The result . of the court cases was the opinion of
a majority of--the
Supreme Court that the First Amendme·nt
-

did not compel licensees to accept editorial advertisements, despite their status of protected speech, and
broadcasters had "journalistic discretion" to choose the
manner by which they would meet public interest obligations.
The Court, in essence, treated the broadcasters like the
printed press, but the printed press has generally
accepted editorial advertisements,

This general accep-

tance was pointed out in Mr. Douberley's survey of major
daily newspapers.
Confusion over access rights ., and more basically

competing constitutional rights, begins when recalling
the arguments of licensees en route to the final Supreme

Court decision.

Licensees claimed that the Fairness

Doctrine and the Communications Act sufficiently satisfied the public's First Amendment rights.

The Supreme

Court, reviewing legislative action (Communications Act}
and federal agency precedent (Fairness Doctrine}, agreed
that the best manner to .meet public interest obligations
was to allow licensees journalistic discretion over their
air time.

Yet, it was also stated that licensees may,

if they choose, accept editorial advertisements.

To

do this, broadcasters maintained, would subject them to

78
Fairne.ss Doctrine obligations and potentially destroy
their business and integrity by giving free time to oppo-

How can the Fairness Doc-

nents of particular opinion ads.

trine, in relation to editorial advertising, satisfy individual free speech, if its mere existence frightens broadcasters into refusing such advertisements?

The existence of

this paradox does not seem consistent with the maintenance
of a free expression system.
Broadc.asters have also argued that they have temporary
property rights because they "lease" electromagnetic frequencies from the government.
limited.

This argument, however is

It involves conflicting constitutional rights ·

(licensees property v. citizens' free expression).

Balan-

cing these rights has been settled in Marsh v. Alabama.

That

case involved a woman arrested for trespassing while distributing religious literature in a company-owned town.

Justice

Black, delivering the Court's opinion, stated:
Wheti we balance constitutional rights of owners of
property against those of the people to enjoy freedom
of the press and religion·:. we remain mindful of the
fact that the latter occupy a preferred position.157
Also se·en in these recent editorial advertising cases
were competing First Amendment rights.

The Supreme Court

clearly stated in their Red Lion decision that the public's
rights of speech were "paramount."

The existence of this

type of competition does not seem consistent with
the complementary relationship of

157
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..

necessary for the maintenance of a · free expression
system •
. Editorial advertising could not only provid·e free
expression, but also .r einstate the· complementary relationship if the Fairness Doctrine was not compelled upon
broadcasters, who would otherwise be willing ·to accept
such advertising • . "The ability to rent or use mass
media ••• is a clear alternative to a 'fairness doctrine.'"

158

Other issues, repeatedly raised concerning attempts
to buy broadcast advertising time for opinions, were
inappropriateness of format and d.ominance by the weal thy.

The latter issue would be a problem of implementation and
regulation.

The inappropriateness of format has been

shown to be a minor and moot argument; e.g., Jaffe has
stated a
••• such reasoning may be thought an expression of
intellectual snobbery, The uncomplicated truths and
falsehoods most apt for mass media may be better and
more succinctly said in one than five minutes. The
message at least alerts. the listener to the issue
and, if it comes from a source which he trusts or
159
distrusts, helps him to find his way to taking sides •••
Furthermore, the oversimplification of issues, programs·,
and other forms of communication already exists in the
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.
160
broadcast media due to time lim~ts •·.
. Editorial adver-.

8'0

tising, therefore,would be just as appropriate as the
standard two-m·inute editorial and might enhance · free ·
expression by offering divergent · viewpoints.
Until evidence is obtained indicating the willingness of broadcasters to accept editorial advertising, with
and without Fairness Doctrine obligations, the data sug- ·
gests that use of opinion ads on radio ·or television will
meet heavy opposition.

It must be reiterated, however,

that there is no law or governmental policy which speci-

fically prohibits editorial advertisements from being
broadcast •

. It appears that •· in spite of

~he

recent Supreme

~

Court decision, similar attempts at gaining access to
paid air time will continue in an effort to realize free
expression.

These attempts will probably result in legal

action if the advocat$construct arguments based on their
First Amendment rights of free speech.
Eventually, broadcasters, like publishers, will probably accept editorial advertising in light of public
161
opinion
secure in the knowledge that they still retain
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their journalistic discretion.
Other Media
·The main issues concerning the use of editorial

advertising in media other than print or broadcast

have generally_centered on the concept of "open public
forum."

If the particular medium or vehicle in question

already accepts advertising, then editorial ads will
probably also be accepted, provided that they are not obscene and do not present a clear and_ present danger
to the public.
Should attempts to place editorial advertising in
media such as busline card space, trains, subways, taxis,
or other public facilities, be rej'ected due to a pa·rticular company's policy then advertisers would probably
have a good legal case based on free spe.e ch arguments.
There is not sufficient evidence to

pre~ict

the

possible results of attempts to secure advertising space
in exclusively private media such as outdoor advertising

boards.
IMPLEMENTATION

The future use of editorial advertising depends on
the development of a uniform system whereby opinion advertisements, which meet general standards of obscenity,
libel, and clear and present danger, can be recognized
as .frae expression.

Such a system must contain practical

regulations for purchasing of media space or time,

This

8'2

latter
media.

prereq~isite
~lso,

is especially

n~cessary

for·· broadcas.t

some provisions must be made for indivi-

duals or groups who have neither the talent nor the · ·
immediate purchasing power to create and finance their
own o·p inion ads.
-

--

The problem of identifying editorial advertisements
as such might be solved by assuming the definition presented in this text,

They must clearly express opinions

on public issues and must not be sponsored by profit-

making entities who may eventually profit by sucn advertisements,

Standards of obscenity, libel, and clear and

present danger would be the same as other advertisements,
programs, or editorial material; i.e,, ·the messages would
•·

have to meet those standards of the

m~dia

sought.

The area of "which messages" and "how manyn proves
to be the most taxing problem,

The

p~oblem,

however,

would not be too difficult to overcome in print media
which already accepts advertising of this nature.

Broad-

cast media pose quite a different problem.
An implementation system for editorial advertising .
on radio and television would require the cooperation of
licensees and the Federal Communications Commission to

establish uniform guidelines of selection.

A realistic

approach would not be overwhelming, as suggested by the
Supreme Court's decision in the BEM case.

Nor would it

be as simple as the first-come-first-served suggestion of
Commissioner Johnson.

8)
A pract~cal system co~ld b~ similar ·to tha~ of present
time purchasing procedures with the following additionsa
An agreed percentage of licensees• total advert-ising would
be made available for potential editorial·advertisements.
This criterion would be imposed when requests exceeded
time alloted,

A daily, weekly, monthly, yearly, etc.,

limit would be· placed on the number of spots purchased
.

.

by a particular sponsor.

Spots could be heard in advance

to avoid duplicate opinion by differing sponsors.

In

that case, a cooperative effort.might be suggested.
Priority should be given, when possible, to messages
162
whose timelines are of essence.
For those persons who do not have the time, talent,
or immediate finances to create and place editorial
advertisements, agencies and credit unions might fill the
void.

Examples of supplemental organizations already

exist.
Public interest advertising groups are proliferating on the west coast and in Washington put to
serve public issues ranging from drug abuse to saving
endangered whales,,,(One such agency)Public Interest
. Communications is described by its founders as the ·
nation's first full-service, non-commercial advertising agency, Initial clients include the American
Civil Liberties Union.16J
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Private agencies like Public Interest Communications would
help assure that potential editorial advertising, especially in broadcast media, would not be dominated by the
wealthy.
funds,

164

This agency is funded by the Stern and Kaplan

A· similar · agency known as Public Advertising Council

considers

its~lf

as "a clearinghouse where

org~nizations

without the means or the creative apparatus can get their

views translated into public interest communications."

165

These agencies have practical roles,_as well as
social ones.

Editorial advertise.me.nts createq. and placed

by them would

probably have a greater

accepted.

chanc~

of be_ing

This notion was somewhat supported by Mr.

Tracy Westen

director of Stern Community La:IV' Firm, who

said, "stations have been reluctant to give

time for

public ·s ervice messages other than tho·se which reach them
through the Advertising Co uric il. "

166

.

Another aid to fair implementation of editorial
advertising

ould be through government loans.

Emerson

has suggested a positive promotion of free expression by
writing,

Government funds that enable private individuals

164
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or groups to engage in expression are being made
available in many fields at ·the · pre's ent time,.. ·
There are also government subsidie.s for the promotion of art and entertainment projects, for legal
assistance in protecting First Amendment rights,
for various types of community organizations and
activities und~r the poverty program ••• The most
direct form of government spending in the aid of
expression is the allowance of · tax deductions for
political _ ~gntributions or the free printing of
position· leaflets in political campaigns,167
An extension of Emerson's suggestion could be made to
opinion messages.

Less fortunate individuals might seek

government loans to .finance advertisements.

Others may

deduct the cost of expressing their views from their
taxes,
The idea that editorial advertising would be
dominated by the wealthy is diminished
when one considers
.
.

the · criteria for implementation and various ·method-s by
which non-wealthy persons or groups could achieve expression.

A"S Justice Brennan suggested in his opinion

on the BEM ·case, it is worthy to attempt and as Judge
Wright stated in the same case before his court, .. all
168
that we may lose is some of our apathy ....
Implementation of a system to integrate editorial
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advertising into the mass media can. be .the practical step
needed to help eliminate the competing First Amendment
rights of individuals and media managers.
been suggested that would maintain ·the

Methods have

independe~ce

of ·

the publishers and licensees, as well as their revenue.
and allow the public the essence of a .free society - the
right to express opinions from one to many,
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This study, being an exploratory analysis, has
raised many questions demanding empirical investigation.
For example, survey research is needed to follow Mr.
Douberley's study examining which .and how many newspapers
do accept editorial advertising.

~ore

data is needed to

determine under what standards it would be acceptable,

A similar survey is desperately needed to determine the
attitudes of broadcast licensees toward editorial advertising.

How many licensees accept it? · How many even

know what it is?

If they do or do not accept it, then

what are their reasons?

Special attention should be paid

to the effect of the Fairne-s s Doctrine on acceptance of
editorial advertisinge
Surveys of the same basic nature are needed from
media such as public television and outdoor advertising

companies.
Based on the arguments from the legal cases that
controversial issues would bore or infuriate readers,

viewers, and listeners, experimental res arch might be

.
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.

conducted comparing attitudinal and

be~avioral

reactions

between editorial advertisements and commercial advertisements,
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study was designed to examine editorial adver-

tising within the context of the First Amendment.
examination was intended to determine whether

or

Such
not

editorial advertising is .a means of free expression.
determination was made on the ·following bases:

(1)

The
the

differentiation of editorial advertising from other forms
of advertising and from editorializing;

statust

{J)

(2) its legal

its practical uses.

A review of the relevant rese.a rch has suggested that
editorial advertising maintains a unique position compared
to commercial advertising.

It is protected speech as

defined by the First Amendment.

It has also been differ-

entiated from other ·forms of editorializing due to its
paid nature.
opinions

This has allowed individuals to express their

unedited~

Legal cases involving editorial advertising have
suggested that it has been accepted

by

major national

newspapers and has been supported as free expression.

use in broadcast media has been

se~iously

Its

questioned for

practical reasons, but there has been no dictum prohi-

biting such use.

The main issues resulting in attempted

use of editorial advertisements have been over a right of
access to the media as an extension of the Firs·t Amendment.

88

No such right has been granted,
Implementation of a system to regulate the use of
editorial advertising has been the most difficult problem.
Recent suggestions, however, seem to have mitigated some
of the earlier doubts,

It has also been suggested that

public opinion will eventually demand, .at least a trial
and error period to test its use, particularly in broadcast media • .
A need has also been suggested to supplement legal
opinions and practical implementation plans of editorial
advertising with empirical research.
As society grows more complex, the need to express
one's opinion to the community becomes more and more
essential if we are to maintain a semblance of freedo·m ,
and democracy,

Editorial advertising is one tool within

a modern institution that has proven .to help meet these
increasing needs for free expression.
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• The President has transformed grand juries into 1928 Yi.ret!spping V~..se:
instruments of political surveillance and r.arassment,
In a govemrrrenc of laws, exfs!ence of the go~
tinue, then the destruction of the Bill ot Ri.:Jhts cou!d and caused pot:tica!!y motiva ed indictments to issue.
ernment wi'! re imoenl:d if it fags to observe !he
follow. H. after all the Watergate revelationS, w~ allow • The President has attacked tAe freedom cf tho
law scrupulouslr. Our {;O'.<€mment is the po.'enC
the omnipresent teacher. For gcoo or for iU, it.
him to continue. we are accomplices to that press, and subjected news reportars to illegal wireteaches the whole p:;r..J()Ie l:!! its exam~. Crl m
taps aro harassing FBI investigations.
destruction.
is rontagious. If t/',1'1 go•~rrrent l:Yx:omes a
ConS-der what has already haPC€r100:
TOO doct;ne o: "inher9nr power
lavf-breaf:er; it bre€d5 contempt for law; it inv.tes
• On Jul)' 23. 1970, the Presiden t P.ersonally
Richard Nixon i:> not the first president to violate
e\lery man to recome a law unto himself; it
approved the "Huston plan" tor poli:ca! surveillance
invites anarchy. To dedare rr.a in the adminisby such metll<Xis as burg!ary, wiretapping, eaves- consntutional rights and he wi!l not l:::e the last
tration of. .. Jaw ~~~ end jus:i{;es the· means._
dropping, mJil covers a:lCI spying on stu<::ents by But r.o president has ever before systematically
would bring terrib!e r e~iouton._._
the CIA and other agencies. These metr.OOs 1tere claimed that the Bill of Rights, whict1 limits o her
employex:l against dissenters, political OP'IX)nents, go~ment officiab, does not limit the Pres!dent or
To preset\'9 and PfOtect cur system of in<f.~kiua!
his agents.
ne.vs n:~rters, and government emp!oyees.
r)ghts under law, to restore tr.e in:'3Jn:Y of the Siil Of
When
he
wiretapped
in
V.olation
of
the
Constitu• ~11971, the President establ:shed ....~!hin'the Whrta
Rights br ~sand our children, and to make the
House a personal secret police (the "plumbers'') tion. he claimed an "inherent' po\ver to do so.
lesson dear to al futura t::res:Cents in Wr.os.9 hc:r.ds
When he secretiy oombcd Camt:xxlia, he claimed we place our lives. Ricr.ard N~ must s>.and ~.al
~rating outside the restraintc; of law, and engJging in burgl3ry, i!l£gal wiretaps, espionage and an ·inherenr' power to do so.
before tt-.a Sena!e.lf he coes not sEnd tria!, what he
When he directed the drag nat arrests of thou- has done wi I re dor!e b'f otrers.
perj:Jry.
• Wht.le Daniel 81sberg was facing tr:al, his psycrJ- sands of demonstrators in Washing on, he claimed
How to Impeach President Nixen
a!rlc records . v ere burgl:;rizoo by 'N;•ite House an ·;nr:erenr' povver to do so
If the President is po:;m1itted to use the doctrine of
In order to sta:ld tnat before the ~:e. where a
a:des and, a: the direction of the President, a White
House aJde discussed tr.e d:rectorship of the -fBI ~inherent" poy,ter to override the Bill of Rights a y- tv:o·thirds vote is n~ry for con·i.ctXJ."l, o·:e Presclime he plc::ases, civil liberties can be cancelled dent mustfirs:ooacc~bya ma:oriryofthe House
vli!h the judge presiding over Ellst:erg's tria!.
of Representa'.:•.us. This aN"f.JS2._"'.an by tt.e HO'.JSe is
at whim.
~ Prr:ate detectives were hired 'rJ.{ wr. :~e House aides
The President or the United St:Jtes shouid SfTTlbol- ca!:ed im~r:hment !moe<!~ ment itstlf d003 not
to spy on the sex lite, drinking ha!:ltts and family
ize Ollr sr-.tem of individual rights under law. He sets result in L'le remo·tal ot the Pr~t UKe an inddproblems or political opr.onents.
• Supporters of possible pr~ential opponents of the precedent for fUiure presiden ts. As U.S. men. i merely D?;;insa t:'..;!. lmpP...ad",ment !s v.t:at
Presidl:n! Nixon were marked as "enemie5" on a Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis said in a the Hot.'Se of Re;xas.en~:r.-es does; lt'.t! actual trial
is held by tt~e ~;,;!e. v;~ oo:ie.-e such a tr a1 must
special list. and targeted for harassment by the Interm.li?c..U~M~B~~~r;:;;:~a take place, ho •teVer un~e;:_sant
nal Re..-enue Service.
• Dtlring thrl*! days in May 1971, over 13,000
American Civil lloordos Union ~ The country can v.1tlistar.d the resi;)naron of the
Vice Pres:denl
people were illegaHy arr~ted in Washington, D.C.
84 Fdih A·ICnue. Ne·.v York, N.Y. 10011
The country can Yi.!hstand the impeachment o(
The dragnet arrests, unprecedented in AmetlV!n
c Enclosed is my contribution of S
r~
the President.
history, Wt.'ffi declared uneunsb:U:K:Jnal 'rJy u-~ courts.
to he!o !he lrn;.oc.Jchment Campaign.
U
The coon !I)' ccnnot w!hstand a S'f31em of !XesiTo ju5tily the arrests, a V/hite House spokesm:ln,
ol am w::.inq 10 write mt R presentative, ~
dentia! oower un:imitoo 'rlt the BJ ol H!]t'1ts.
WiiEam R~:hnquist, invented 'tha doctnne ot "qualiand participate in tho Impeachment ~
If you t:A.:Iie ,-e tha t Pre:;;dc-nt !.tOO should oo
f.ed martial law.''
Campa;gn . P!easA conl3ct me.
(j
brought o tnaf b0!ora e Senate for tus Vl<)(a:..oro
•In 1973, tho Pre--..,ident borr:bod Camtxxf:a, a neuc! wa1t 1o pin ACLU. Credit ·my contribuof civ1lhbertles. jotn tho campaj)n !or imoPJ3Chmenl
tral country. w1thout the authorilahon of Congress.
n IO'N:!rds membership:
r1 Ma~e your voce count tn de~~ o( u;e 81li of Rt;;h~.
We learned tntur that he hJd bc.-en oomblng Cam·
c $ 15 !ndiVldual o S2 5 Joint o Mora
l4
(1tc your RP.CX!:<:.t.'f1:.a '·IQ n Ccc;Jw::; in w~ oort
bxiiJ torthrceye;usand r.a d ~~bera!elyconcea: oo
l of v-tmccachm~-fl
Name
ci
t. And. d 'w('...U are net t .:t a mcmr.er
tho bombing from ConrJrC"~". and from 10 p:o<jpll:',
Addrocs
f~ ol ACLIJ. P:Da!'..e u-:,e !ho ccu~ !o ~n. V,CJ ~'Dd
tl e~et:tt ur.urping the war·1r. lj ng p::ivr·rs of Cvnyour t -~» 11"1 tl'us c.t.:nuc..'Ury camp.;i)n for im·
gr.ess. When tr.o d.:u:;t.on w:l': re-, ""..tit..'tl, :hJ Prtrir.rochrncnt ar.o in mo dd till day OJI cj(}.c:fl!.e ot the
den( r..:3:d he would do u.o samo thtng un<k:r SlmilJr
~ s.:1o1 rr~nt<>.
circum:;tanct:S.
Richard Nixon has not left us in doubt. He means

b function a.OOve the law. fl he is allowed to con-
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